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There Are No Pequots on the Plains:
Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming
Kathryn R.L. Rand*
INTRODUCTION
“We had tried poverty for 200 years, so we decided to try
something else.”1  Ray Halbritter was referring to his own tribe,
the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, but the sentiment might
have applied to each of the nearly 150 tribes that decided to pur-
sue casino-style gaming during the 1990s as a means of tribal eco-
nomic development.  For the last decade, gaming tribes across the
country have lauded the financial and social successes of their
casinos.  The tribes’ accounts largely have been corroborated by
empirical research.  In 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission (NGISC) reported that Indian gaming has allowed
tribes “to take unprecedented steps to begin to address the eco-
nomic as well as social problems on their own.”2  In addition, a
study conducted by the Harvard Project on American Indian Eco-
nomic Development concluded in 2000 that both surrounding lo-
calities and tribes benefit substantially from tribal casinos,
particularly in the poorest areas of the country.3  Indeed, leading
tribal gaming researchers recently concluded “the idea that the
consequences of Indian gaming are largely negative, either for In-
* Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law.  B.A., University of
North Dakota, 1990; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1993.  This article benefited
greatly from the input and suggestions of Steven A. Light, my partner and collaborator.  I
would like to thank the editors of Chapman Law Review for inviting me to contribute to
this symposium issue.  I also would like to thank the University of North Dakota School of
Law for its financial support of student researchers, and Sam Jandt and Rebecca Graves
for their research assistance.
1 Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical
Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 531, 568
(1994) (quoting Ray Halbritter, Nation Representative, Oneida Indian Nation of New
York).
2 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT, at 6-6 (1999), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT].
3 Jonathan B. Taylor et al., The National Evidence on the Socioeconomic Impacts of
American Indian Gaming on Non-Indian Communities 29-30 (April 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Chapman Law Review).
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dians or non-Indians, is misguided and unacquainted with the
facts.”4
If the previous reports are true, one might ask why the Boston
Globe reported in late 2000 that Indian gaming has resulted in
“[u]ntold riches for a few, smaller tribes . . . and continued poverty
for the vast majority of Indians spread out across rural America.”5
Furthermore, why did some federal policymakers respond by call-
ing for legislation that would, in effect, make it more difficult for
many tribes to pursue gaming?6
Even as Indian gaming provides vital public revenue for
many tribes, allowing them to begin to address the collective
plight of the poorest ethnic group in the country,7 many policy-
makers appear eager to further remove gaming from tribal con-
trol.  Indian gaming has been controversial since its advent,
raising a myriad of concerns, both substantiable and otherwise.
In the decade following Congress’s enactment of the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act,8 politics has proven as great a force as law in
shaping the practicalities of tribal gaming.9  In the past several
years, concerns appear to have shifted from whether tribal gaming
enterprises comply with applicable law to whether tribal gaming
itself—legal or not—is a desirable political outcome.
Most recently, Indian gaming has been faulted as a failed pol-
icy experiment, a criticism that has wielded a great deal of influ-
ence in the public discourse.  Tribal gaming, critics charge, does
not work:  it has failed to solve the “Indian problem,”10 as evi-
denced by continuing poverty, unemployment, and other social ills
on reservations.  Accompanying this fundamental criticism is a
host of related concerns:  that tribes, inexperienced in running
successful economic enterprises, may be taken advantage of by
non-Indian investors; that gaming is contrary to “Indian” values,
suggesting that “casino Indians”11 are not really Indian at all; that
4 STEPHEN CORNELL ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN GAMING POLICY AND ITS SOCIO-ECO-
NOMIC EFFECTS: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 77
(1998).
5 Michael Rezendes, Few Tribes Share in Casino Windfall, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11,
2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 3354974 [hereinafter Rezendes, Casino Windfall].
6 See, e.g., H.R. 2244, 107th Cong. (2001); infra notes 66-77.
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000 7 tbl.B (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-214.pdf.
8 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2001).
9 See Kathryn R.L. Rand, At Odds? Perspectives on the Law and Politics of Indian
Gaming, GAMING L. REV. vol. 5 No. 4, at 297 (2001) (introducing special issue on Indian
gaming).
10 “Indian problem” is an old term from federal Indian policy, and it is used generally
to refer to Indian poverty and other social ills.
11 See, e.g., Chris Powell, Editorial, Pequot Museum May Feed Mistaken Guilt, PROVI-
DENCE J., Jan. 2, 2001, at B4, available at 2001 WL 5370897 (“Many other aspiring casino
Indians are coming out of the woodwork.”).
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casinos breed organized crime; and that some tribes’ casinos are
too successful.12
Current law plays a limited role in the debate; instead, the
focus is on reforming the law to address these and other policy
concerns.  Recent debate has focused on the handful of highly suc-
cessful gaming tribes—particularly the Mashantucket Pequots of
Connecticut—feeding concerns that simply do not apply to a large
number of tribes, particularly in middle America.  I explore this
focus on a few successful, relatively small, and often relatively re-
cently organized tribes through what I call the “Pequot Model.”13
At the forefront of popular debate, the Pequot Model, I argue,
threatens to unduly influence policymakers by fueling assump-
tions that most gaming tribes resemble the Pequots.
Missing from the almost frenetic level of public debate con-
cerning the Pequots in the popular media is a meaningful discus-
sion of the interrelationship between tribal gaming and tribal
sovereignty.  In a discourse rife with economic bottom lines and
challenges to authenticity, there appears to be little concern for
preserving tribal sovereignty from any camp other than the tribes
themselves.  To the extent sovereignty is mentioned, most news
accounts are simplistically critical of tribes’ exercise of sovereignty
in the context of gaming.14  Policymakers, too, seem inclined to
gloss over tribal sovereignty concerns, choosing to focus on the
problems perceived by their non-Indian constituents.
Yet, I argue that sovereignty, rather than net profits, provides
the necessary foundation for assessing whether tribal gaming is
successful.  Research conducted by the Harvard Project on Ameri-
can Indian Economic Development shows that tribal sovereignty
precedes reservation economic development; without strong tribal
government, tribes are unlikely to successfully pursue economic
enterprises.15  The Harvard Project research plainly indicates that
self-determination is a desirable federal Indian policy, but I argue
that policymakers also should use sovereignty as an assessment
tool.  If Indian gaming strengthens tribal governments, then even
modest economic success may be expected to result in healthier
reservation communities, and an increased likelihood that tribes
12 See discussion infra Part II.
13 Although I base this model on criticism levied at the Mashantucket Pequots in par-
ticular, the model might also encompass the heightened public debate over Indian gaming
in California following the passage of Proposition 1A. See infra note 128.
14 Following the Boston Globe series, editorials decried exercises of tribal sovereignty,
called for increased federal and state oversight, and warned that “casino Indians” would
breed corruption and crime. See, e.g., Editorial, The Big Gamble, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar.
17, 2001, at B6, available at 2001 WL 10337361; Editorial, No Tribal Casino Is an Island,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2001, at 8, available at 2001 WL 3732863; Editorial, Regu-
lating Tribal Casinos, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2001, at A10, available at 2001 WL
3934250; Powell, supra note 11; see also infra note 147.
15 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-8.
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will be able to pursue avenues of economic development outside of
gaming.
This is particularly true for tribes whose casino profits are un-
likely ever to approach those of the Pequots, even those tribes
that, as described by the Boston Globe, experience “continued pov-
erty for the vast majority of Indians spread out across rural
America.”16  To illuminate and assess the success of these tribes, I
offer a different model of Indian gaming in contrast to the Pequot
Model:  the “Plains Model.”  The Plains Model is based on the ex-
periences of large, land-based “treaty tribes”17 in North Dakota,
and is an alternative lens through which to assess the impacts of
tribal gaming.  The Plains Model, I posit, reveals the notable suc-
cess of many gaming tribes in terms of preserving tribal sover-
eignty and strengthening tribal government, which, in turn,
allows those tribes to begin to rectify persisting social ills on the
reservation.  Law and policy adopted in response to the Pequot
Model of tribal gaming, I argue, risks undermining the small, and
not-so-small, gains in the quality of reservation life made by tribes
like those in North Dakota and across the Great Plains.
Part I, provides a brief overview of the history of Indian gam-
ing and the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, as
well as a short account of gaming’s effects on reservation economic
development.  Part II recounts recent criticism of tribal gaming in
the national media and its influence on policymakers, particularly
at the federal level.  In Parts III and IV, I set forth the Pequot
Model and the Plains Model, respectively.  I then turn, in Part V,
to the policy implications of the models, arguing that lawmakers
should consider the Plains Model both in assessing the success of
tribal gaming and in weighing the effects of further limiting tribal
gaming and diminishing tribal sovereignty.  I conclude by assert-
ing that even well-meaning criticisms of Indian gaming that char-
acterize the important successes of gaming tribes like those in
North Dakota as failures, run the risk of further compromising
tribes’ abilities to address often dire social conditions on reserva-
tions throughout the United States.
I. INDIAN GAMING
A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In the late 1970s, spurred by the federal government’s policy
of tribal self-determination, several Native American tribes ex-
16 Rezendes, Casino Windfall, supra note 5.
17 The term “treaty tribes” refers to those Native American tribes that entered into
treaties, many still existing, with the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
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plored various tools of reservation economic development.18  Casi-
nos and bingo halls soon proved profitable, and tribes expanded
their gaming outfits by offering bigger prizes and longer hours.19
The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians in California
offered high-stakes bingo on their reservations, in contravention
of state regulations limiting jackpot amounts.20  California as-
serted the application of its gambling laws on the reservations,
but in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Su-
preme Court held that states could not regulate reservation gam-
ing enterprises.21  Using the prohibitory-regulatory doctrine to
analyze California’s statute, the Court reasoned that if a state did
not prohibit a specific type of gambling altogether, the state could
not regulate that type of gambling on an Indian reservation.22  At
the heart of the Court’s decision was a balancing of competing in-
terests:  tribal and federal interests in tribal self-sufficiency and
reservation economic development, weighed against the state’s in-
terest in regulating gambling to prevent the infiltration of organ-
ized crime.23  The Court concluded that California’s interest was
insufficient “to escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal
interests apparent in this case.”24
The Cabazon decision was an unexpected victory for tribes,
but as Congress already had identified Indian gaming as a poten-
tial regulatory problem, the victory came late in the game.
Shortly after the Court issued its decision in Cabazon, Congress
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).25  One of
IGRA’s express congressional purposes was “to provide a statutory
basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal governments.”26
18 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.
19 Id.
20 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 205 (1987).
21 Id. at 221-22.
22 Id. at 208-12.
23 Id. at 216-22.
24 Id. at 221.
25 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2001).  For discussions of the events preceding IGRA’s enact-
ment, see W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS
53-64 (2000), and Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes
the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
381, 398-400 (1997) [hereinafter Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice].
26 25 U.S.C. § 2702.  The other stated purposes of IGRA are:
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe
adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to en-
sure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and
to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and
players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority
for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on
Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are
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Widely regarded as a political compromise, IGRA increased
the states’ role in regulating Indian gaming beyond that man-
dated by Cabazon.  Under IGRA’s now-familiar framework, the
type of gambling determines the regulatory jurisdiction.  Tribes
have exclusive authority to regulate “Class I” gaming, consisting
of social games and traditional tribal gambling.27  With federal
oversight, tribes also have authority to regulate bingo and non-
banking card games, or “Class II” gaming.28  However, “Class III”
gaming, or casino-style gambling, requires tribes to successfully
negotiate an agreement with the state—a “Tribal-State com-
pact”—governing the specifics of the tribal casino.29
As written, IGRA attempted to level the tribal-state negotia-
tion table by creating a cause of action for tribes to sue states that
declined to negotiate a Tribal-State compact in good faith.30  In
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, however, the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not have the power to authorize such an action
against a state.31  Thus, the Court altered IGRA’s balance of power
between states and tribes.  Subsequently, some states have re-
fused to negotiate compacts, effectively precluding tribal casino-
style gaming within their borders.32
Many tribes successfully negotiated compacts prior to Semi-
nole Tribe.  In 1998, roughly a decade after IGRA’s enactment, 146
tribes operated Class III casinos under nearly two hundred Tribal-
State compacts.33  Many tribes, of course, have decided not to pur-
sue Class III gaming or, in some cases, any form of gaming.  Of the
554 tribes in the United States recognized by the federal govern-
ment, only a third or so conduct Class III gaming on their reserva-
necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such
gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.
Id.
27 Id. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1).
28 Id. §§ 2703(7)(A), 2710(b).  A tribe may conduct Class II gaming only if it “is located
within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person” and it is not pro-
hibited by federal law. Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
29 Id. §§ 2703(8), 2710(d).  Class III gaming consists of “all forms of gaming that are
not class I gaming or class II gaming,” particularly banking card games, electronic facsimi-
les of games, and slot machines. Id. §§ 2703(8), 2703(7)(B).
30 Id. § 2710(d)(7).
31 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).  For discussions of potential post-Seminole Tribe procedures
under IGRA, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Scope of Gaming, Good Faith Negotiations and the
Secretary of Interior’s Class III Gaming Procedures: Is I.G.R.A. Still a Workable Framework
After Seminole?, GAMING L. REV. vol. 5 No. 4, at 401 (2001), and Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee’s Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121 (1997).
32 See Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REV.
427, 430 (2001).
33 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-2.  There are more compacts than com-
pacting tribes because some tribes have separate compacts for separate gaming facilities.
Id. at 6-2 n.8.
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tions.34  However, of the 225 or so tribes in the forty-eight
contiguous, states nearly eighty-five percent conduct gaming.35
B. Indian Gaming and Reservation Life
As has been discussed extensively elsewhere, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, as throughout the twentieth century, res-
ervations were places of extraordinary poverty.  In terms of social
health, Native American communities exemplified the worst liv-
ing conditions in the United States.  Many Native Americans, par-
ticularly those residing on reservations, were poor, unemployed,
and living in overcrowded and inadequate housing in communities
with minimal government services.  In some areas, reservation
unemployment topped eighty percent, even as non-Indian commu-
nities experienced historically low unemployment rates.36  Native
Americans were more likely to suffer from diabetes, alcoholism,
and fetal alcohol syndrome than other Americans.37  Indian chil-
dren and young adults were two to three times more likely than
the national average to commit suicide.38  Native Americans were
also twice as likely to be victims of violent crime than other ethnic
groups; for example, Native American women were nearly three
times as likely to suffer violent crime at the hands of their inti-
mate partners than white women.39
A decade later, conditions on many reservations are still lag-
ging significantly behind those of other ethnic groups in the
United States.  Yet there have been marked improvements for
many Native American communities, largely due to gaming reve-
nue.  The NGISC concluded, “As was IGRA’s intention, gambling
revenues have proven to be a very important source of funding for
many tribal governments, providing much-needed improvements
in the health, education, and welfare of Native Americans on res-
34 Id. at 6-2.  Of course, not all tribal casinos are successful.  Some operate at a loss,
while many others break even or make only modest profits. Id. at 6-3.
35 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 11-12.
36 Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Raising the Stakes: Tribal Sovereignty and
Indian Gaming in North Dakota, GAMING L. REV. vol. 5 No. 4, at 329, 334 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes]; see also NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-5
to 6-6 (testimony of Sen. John McCain).
37 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 24-26 (citing U.S. Census Bureau and Department
of Health and Human Services figures); see also Rand & Light, Virtue or Vice, supra note
25, at 394.
38 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 25 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S11881 (Aug. 8, 1995)
(testimony of Sen. John McCain)).
39 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Differences in
Rates of Violent Crime Experienced by Whites and Blacks Narrow (Mar. 18, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/vvr98pr.htm (describing the results of the
BJS study, Violent Victimization and Race, 1993-98).  Although white offenders primarily
choose white victims, Native Americans are more likely to be victimized by non-Indians.
Id.
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ervations across the United States.”40  Additionally, research con-
ducted by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development “repeatedly finds that tribal gaming enterprises
yield positive economic and social benefits to those tribes that ex-
ercise their sovereignty and choose to enter the game.”41
Numerous tribes credit casinos with improving, sometimes
vastly, reservation living conditions.  The Oneida Indian Nation of
New York operates the Turning Stone Casino Resort, one of the
most successful tribal gaming enterprises in the country.  With
revenue from the casino, the Nation provides housing, health care,
education, employment, and other essential government services
to its members.  Gaming revenue reinforces tribal sovereignty, ac-
cording to one tribal official, “giv[ing] us the tools we need to
bridge the gap between merely surviving and thriving.”42
Half a continent away, the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin enjoys
similar gaming success, as extolled by a report issued by the Wis-
consin Policy Research Institute, “The Oneida Tribe . . . is en-
joying its first generation of prosperity in more than two
centuries.  For the Oneidas, the gaming franchise has been more
successful than all previous anti-poverty programs in providing
jobs, self-esteem, and a bright future.”43  In neighboring Minne-
sota, the Prairie Island Indian Community credits its Treasure Is-
land Resort and Casino with improving the lives of tribal
members by providing funds for government services, including
constructing housing, a government administration building, a
community center, and a waste water treatment facility.  The
tribe also uses casino revenue to provide health care and educa-
tion to its members.44  For the Tohono O’odham Nation in south-
ern Arizona, gaming revenue has paid for a new community
college and nursing home, as well as for health care, fire protec-
tion, and youth recreation centers.45  In California, the Viejas
Band of Kumeyaay Indians uses gaming revenue to provide gov-
ernment services for its members, including law enforcement,
40 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-2.
41 Joseph P. Kalt, Statement Before the National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion 2 (Mar. 16, 1998) (transcript on file with Chapman Law Review).
42 Kristen A. Carpenter & Ray Halbritter, Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and the Buf-
falo: Some Thoughts on American Indian Tribes and Gaming, GAMING L. REV. vol. 5 No. 4,
at 311, 323 (2001) (quoting Nation Representative Ray Halbritter, Oneida Nation Annual
Report 2000, Sec. I).
43 Daniel J. Alesch, The Impact of Indian Casino Gambling on Metropolitan Green
Bay, WIS. POL’Y RES. INST. REP., Sept. 1997, at 1, available at http://www.wpri.org/Reports/
Volume10/Vol10no6.pdf.
44 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-15 (quoting Carrel Campbell, Secretary of
the Prairie Island Indian Community).
45 Indian Gaming: Oversight Hearing on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (July 25, 2001) (statement of David LaSarte), available at 2001
WL 21757800.
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road maintenance, and waste removal.46  As Ernest Stevens,
Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Association, said:
Perhaps the most important point is that Indian gaming has
served to build strong tribal governments, and promote tribal
economic self-sufficiency.  Tribes now have schools, health clin-
ics, water systems, and roads that exist only because of Indian
gaming.  Tribes have a long way to go because too many of our
people continue to live with disease and poverty, but Indian
gaming offers hope for the future.47
Nevertheless, despite these and other successes, casino-style gam-
ing on reservations continues to be controversial, sparking heated
public debate.
II. RECENT CRITICISM OF INDIAN GAMING
In December 2000, the Boston Globe ran a four-part series ti-
tled, “Tribal Gamble:  The Lure and Peril of Indian Gambling.”48
The first article in the series asserted, “Born partly of a desire to
apply the ‘80s faith in free enterprise to the nation’s poorest ethnic
group, the story of Indian gaming is now one of congressional in-
tentions gone awry.”49  Alluding to the fact that only about one-
third of the approximately 550 federally recognized tribes have
chosen to pursue gaming, the article stated that “two-thirds of In-
dians get nothing at all” from tribal gaming enterprises.50  As fur-
ther proof of Indian gaming’s failures, the article cited
“widespread skepticism” about the authenticity of tribes and their
members; the “virulent disputes” between gaming tribes and sur-
rounding communities; limited non-tribal government oversight of
casinos, “already allegedly infiltrated in some places by under-
world figures”; and decreased federal spending on programs bene-
fiting Native Americans.51
These criticisms were expanded in the series’s other articles.
The second article decried the poverty of many Native Americans
in the face of the “mind-boggling wealth” of a few gaming tribes:
“[Twelve] years after the federal government made gambling a
46 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-15 (quoting Anthony R. Pico, Chairman of
the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians).
47 Indian Gaming: Oversight Hearing on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (July 25, 2001) (statement of Ernest Stevens, Jr.), available at
2001 WL 21757798 [hereinafter 2001 Indian Gaming Hearing].
48 Sean Murphy, A Big Roll at Mohegan Sun, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2000, at A1,
available at 2000 WL 3355062 [hereinafter Murphy, Mohegan Sun]; Rezendes, Casino
Windfall, supra note 5; Ellen Barry, A War of Genealogies Rages, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12,
2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 3355302 [hereinafter Barry, Genealogies]; Michael
Rezendes, Tribal Casino Operations Make Easy Criminal Targets, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13,
2000, available at 2000 WL 30570536 [hereinafter Rezendes, Tribal Casino Operations].
49 Murphy, Mohegan Sun, supra note 48.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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staple of its Indian policy, the overall portrait of America’s most
impoverished racial group continues to be dominated by disease,
unemployment, infant mortality, and school drop-out rates that
are among the highest in the nation.”52  Indeed, the article called
tribal gaming “simply the latest in a century-and-a-half of unful-
filled promises by whites who control the federal government.”53
The Globe series next turned its attention to the federal recog-
nition process, describing “the Indian killer,” an avocational gene-
alogist who works to undermine tribes’ applications for federal
recognition.54  The article contended that recognition is “the key to
enormous fortunes” in gaming.55  The headline of the final article
in the series asserted, “Tribal casino operations make easy crimi-
nal targets.”56  Despite the dearth of evidence indicating criminal
infiltration of tribal casinos,57 the article cited “gaming analysts’”
opinion that “inadequate oversight of Indian casinos and increas-
ingly vociferous sovereignty claims could open the door to a new
wave of criminal activity.”58
The Boston Globe series came on the heels of an Associated
Press (AP) analysis of federal unemployment, poverty, and public
assistance records, which showed that although tribal gaming op-
erations experienced varied success, the unemployment rates on
many reservations remained far above the national average.59
“[F]or many of the 130 tribes with Las Vegas-style casinos . . .
gambling revenue pays for casino operations and debt service,
with little left to upgrade the quality of life.”60  At the same time,
however, the AP analysis indicated that Indian gaming had
slowed growth in the number of tribal members receiving public
52 Rezendes, Casino Windfall, supra note 5.
53 Id.
54 Barry, Genealogies, supra note 48.
55 Id.
56 Rezendes, Tribal Casino Operations, supra note 48.
57 Indeed, the article itself noted that “[t]o be sure, tribal gaming authorities and fed-
eral law enforcement officials insist there is no evidence of widespread infiltration of Indian
gambling by organized crime.” Id.
58 Id.  Such “vociferous sovereignty claims,” according to the article, included tribal
attempts to “claim the right to act as the primary overseers of their own casinos, and to
hide financial information about gambling operations that is routinely disclosed by com-
mercial gambling houses.” Id.  The year before the Globe series, Donald Trump had been
criticized for secretly financing advertisements seeking to undermine a proposed tribal ca-
sino in the Catskills.  The advertisements warned that the casino would attract crime, fea-
turing pictures of cocaine and needles and asking, “Are these the new neighbors we want?”
Neil Swidey, Trump Plays Both Sides in Casino Bids, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 2000, at A1,
available at 2000 WL 3355505.
59 David Pace, Casino Revenue Does Little to Improve Lives of Many Indians, Study
Shows, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 1, 2000, at 8A.  For example, the Seminole tribe’s
Hollywood Gaming Center near Miami generates one hundred million dollars per year, but
reservation unemployment was still forty-five percent in 1997.  Associated Press, Snake
Eyes for Tribes:  Indians See Little From $8 Billion in Gambling Revenue, ABC NEWS.COM,
Aug. 31, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/casinos000831.html.
60 Pace, supra note 59.
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assistance.61  Yet researchers warned that change on many reser-
vations would be relatively slow and difficult to measure, as tribal
investment of gaming revenue likely eventually will increase edu-
cational levels, health, and family integrity for tribal members.62
The Globe series, particularly its spin on Indian gaming as
failing to help all Native Americans, particularly the poorest, com-
manded attention from the media, public, and policymakers.  The
Wall Street Journal, reporting on the debate spurred by the Globe
series, stated that Indian gaming, “often viewed as an economic
self-sufficiency program for exploited Native Americans, is now
shadowed by controversy.”63  An editorial in the Christian Science
Monitor called for increased regulation of Indian gaming, citing
the hundreds of tribes seeking federal recognition and the ill ef-
fects of gambling generally.64  The editorial concluded, “To allow
Indian gaming to simply explode with minimum oversight would
only compound the historical injustices visited on [N]ative
Americans.”65
But the critical media analysis, particularly the Boston Globe
reports, perhaps garnered the most attention in policymaking are-
nas.  Immediately following the Boston Globe series, U.S. Repre-
sentative Frank Wolf (R-Virginia) opined, “The whole thing looks
completely and totally out of control.”66  A few days later, Repre-
sentative Wolf stated at a press conference that the Globe articles
“illustrate the unforeseen inequities of the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act, which has resulted in a tainted recognition process, mas-
sive revenue windfalls for the gambling industry and a few well-
connected individuals, and worst of all, continuing poverty for
most Native Americans.”67  A few months later, Representative
Wolf, joined by Representative Robert Simmons (R-Connecticut),
61 Id. (“Participation in the Agriculture Department’s Food Distribution Program on
Indian Reservations increased 8.2% from 1990 to 1997 among tribes with casinos, com-
pared with 57.3% among tribes without them.”).
62 Id. (quoting Jonathan Taylor, a research fellow at the Harvard University Project
on American Indian Economic Development).
63 Micah Morrison, El Dorado at Last: The Casino Boom, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2001,
at A18, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2869838.
64 No Tribal Casino Is an Island, supra note 14.
65 Id.
66 Sean P. Murphy, Congressmen Seeking Probe of Indian Casinos, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 16, 2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 3356244 (internal quotation omitted) [hereinaf-
ter Murphy, Probe of Indian Casinos].
67 Sean P. Murphy, Indian Gaming Act Revision Sought, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20,
2000, at A8, available at 2000 WL 3356457 (internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter Mur-
phy, Revision Sought].  Reiterating the series conclusion almost verbatim, Representative
Wolf stated, “The overall picture is one of untold riches for a few smaller tribes and contin-
ued poverty for the vast majority of Indians spread across rural America.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).  Cf. Rezendes, Casino Windfall, supra note 5 (“The result:  Untold
riches for a few, smaller tribes, annual revenues of $100 million or more for a couple of
dozen additional tribes near major urban centers, and continued poverty for the vast ma-
jority of Indians spread out across rural America.”).
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called for an investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
and the federal recognition process.68  Representative Christopher
Shays (R-Connecticut) commented on the possible impropriety of
recent BIA recognition decisions and said, “Having a casino is like
having a license to print money . . . .  The money is so significant
that it can corrupt very quickly.”69  In a letter addressed to Presi-
dent Clinton, Representatives Shays and Wolf wrote that the “in-
fluence of organized crime on Indian gambling is alarming.  Tribal
leaders often find themselves forced into affiliations with mem-
bers of organized crime rings.”70
In June 2001, Representatives Wolf, Shays, and Riley (R-Ala-
bama), introduced a bill titled “Tribal and Local Communities Re-
lationship Improvement Act.”71 At a press conference attended by
a number of anti-gambling groups, Representative Wolf quoted
the Boston Globe series, concluding that IGRA “has failed to
broadly improve the living conditions of most Native Americans.”72
He continued:
The intent behind IGRA was that it would allow Native Ameri-
cans to lift themselves out of poverty through self reliance, but
the law has not worked as it was intended . . . .  If we continue to
rely on gambling for the future welfare of Native Americans
then most will continue to live in serious poverty[, while] . . . the
victims of the gambling industry will continue to mount. . . .
Gambling has ruined countless lives and increasing its preva-
lence will only increase the number of victims . . . .  The level of
crime, suicide and bankruptcy in a community invariably rises
when a casino opens its doors.73
The proposed legislation would expand a state’s role in approving
casino-style tribal gaming by requiring approval of all Tribal-
State compacts by the state’s governor and legislature.74  At the
press conference, Representative Wolf added, “This legislation
68 Sean P. Murphy, Probe of Tribe Designation Sought, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2001,
at A16, available at 2001 WL 3926416.
69 Sean P. Murphy, Decisions on Status of Tribes Draw Fire Bush Administration Re-
views Parting Actions by Clinton Appointee, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 2001, at A2, available
at 2001 WL 3926281 (internal quotation omitted); see also Sean P. Murphy, Indians Given
a Parting Boost Clinton Aides Grant 3 Groups Rights to Casinos, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25,
2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 3925789.
70 Morrison, supra note 63.
71 H.R. 2244, 107th Cong. (2001).
72 Press Release, U.S. Rep. Frank R. Wolf, Wolf Measure Would Allow State Legisla-
tures to Have Voice in Creation of Gambling Operation on Indian Reservations (June 19,
2001), available at http://www.house.gov/wolf/2001619wolfindianleg.htm [hereinafter Wolf
Press Release].
73 Id.
74 H.R. 2244.  The proposed legislation also would prohibit tribes from offering Class
III gaming on more than one parcel of tribal land, and would establish the “Commission on
Native American Policy” to complete a study of reservation living standards, including
health, infrastructure, economic development, educational opportunities, and housing. Id.
The Commission would consist of representatives from the National Governors Association,
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goes a long way in giving local communities a voice on whether or
not large scale tribal gambling should be allowed in their commu-
nities.”75  Senator Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut) also called for legis-
lative reform, saying, “This is out of hand . . . .  This is all about
casinos now.”76
State and federal policymakers long have been concerned
about the potential negative effects of reservation-based Indian
gaming on surrounding communities, the possible infiltration of
organized crime into tribal casino operations, and the varied social
ills commonly associated with gambling generally.77  Neverthe-
less, three aspects of the recent criticism levied at Indian gaming,
as exemplified by the Globe series and Representative Wolf’s ac-
tions, are of note.  First, the few highly successful gaming tribes
draw disproportionate public criticism, based largely on the sim-
ple fact of their economic success, coupled with the perception that
the resulting wealth is somehow undeserved.  Second, critics al-
lege that Indian gaming is a policy failure, citing the fact that
many Native Americans continue to live in extreme poverty while
a few tribes amass extraordinary wealth.  Third, despite the two
diametric poles of tribes created by such assertions, these two pri-
mary criticisms take a monolithic, pan-Indian approach, reflecting
a lack of recognition of the enormous tribal variation between the
two poles.
By failing to adequately take into account the varying circum-
stances, experiences, and goals of tribes, critics are able to con-
clude that tribes are either too poor or too rich, and thus Indian
gaming works for no tribe.  Yet, as the Pequot and the Plains Mod-
els demonstrate, such simplistic assessments of tribal gaming de-
fine success too narrowly, overlooking the experiences of many, if
not most, gaming tribes across the country.  The Pequot Model
stems from the experiences of the most intensely scrutinized and
highly criticized tribe in the nation, Connecticut’s Mashantucket
Pequots, and its hugely successful Foxwoods Resort Casino.  The
history of the Pequots fundamentally informs questions of the
tribe’s “authenticity,” as well as its present-day status as gaming
titan.
the National Association of Attorneys General, the National Indian Gaming Commission,
local governments, small businesses, gaming tribes, and non-gaming tribes. Id.
75 Wolf Press Release, supra note 72.
76 Morrison, supra note 63.
77 For a discussion of other recent challenges to Indian gaming, see MASON, supra note
25, at 253-58.
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III. THE PEQUOT MODEL
A. History
At one time, the Mashantucket Pequots were one of the most
powerful presences on the present-day eastern seaboard.78  In the
mid-seventeenth century, however, English settlers emigrating
from the Massachusetts Bay Colony ignited a war with the tribe79
that nearly eradicated the Pequots.80  The victors split the few sur-
viving Pequots into small groups controlled by rival tribes.81  In
1666, the Colony of Connecticut created a two thousand-acre res-
ervation for the remaining Pequots in what is now Ledyard, Con-
necticut.82  Due to the envy of white settlers, the General
Assembly of Connecticut reduced the reservation by more than
half, to 989, acres in 1761.83  The tribe owned the 989-acre parcel
until 1855, when the Connecticut General Assembly authorized
the sale of almost eight hundred acres of the Pequots’ land.84
The Pequots’ land was sold at public auction on January 1,
1856, and proceeds were deposited in an account used to fund the
tribe’s basic needs including food, medical care, housing, and fu-
nerals, into the early 1900s.85  The initial decades of the twentieth
century saw the Pequots’ condition worsen as these funds dwin-
dled.86  Housing on the reservation fell into disrepair and the pop-
ulation accordingly declined.87  Following World War II, only two
people of Pequot descent lived on the reservation:  Elizabeth
George Plouffe and her half-sister, Martha Langevin Ellal.88
Elizabeth George and her half-sister protested Connecticut’s
treatment of the Pequots and the state’s attempts to enforce its
78 H.R. REP. NO. 98-43, at 2 (1983).  For a brief and easily accessible history of the
tribe, see Mashantucket Pequots, Tribal Nation History, http://www.foxwoods.com/pequots/
mptn_history.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Tribal Nation History].
79 See Laurence M. Hauptman, The Pequot War and Its Legacies, in THE PEQUOTS IN
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND 69, 71-73 (Laurence M. Hauptman & James D. Wherry eds.,
1990).  The Pequot War lasted from 1634 to 1637. Id.  It consisted of a series of skirmishes
between the settlers and the Pequots, culminating in a final battle on May 26, 1637, in
which English soldiers and their Native American allies attacked a Pequot fort while many
of the Pequot warriors were away. Id.  The infamous final battle resulted in a massacre of
between three hundred and seven hundred children, women, and elderly. Id. at 73.
80 H.R. REP. NO. 98-43, at 2.
81 Id.; Hauptman, supra note 79, at 76.  As a result of this split, the Pequots became
known as members of either the Eastern Pequots or the Western Pequots, depending upon
the location of their captor tribes. H.R. REP. NO. 98-43, at 2.
82 H.R. REP. NO. 98-43, at 2.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Jack Campisi, The Emergence of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 1637-1975, in THE
PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND 117, 132-33 (Laurence M. Hauptman & James D.
Wherry eds., 1990).  The Pequots’ land sold for $8,091.17. Id. at 132.
86 Id. at 133.
87 Id. In 1935, a state survey reported nine tribal members living on the Ledyard res-
ervation, and another thirty-three tribal members living off the reservation. Id.
88 Id. at 135.
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laws on the reservation.89  The two jealously guarded what re-
mained of the Pequot reservation and fought for improved housing
conditions.90  In 1973, however, Elizabeth George died.91  To pre-
serve the tribe, several of her relatives considered returning to
live on the reservation.92  Concerned with the lack of adequate
housing, the relatively few remaining Pequots decided to establish
a more formal tribal structure to better seek outside help.93  Dur-
ing this restructuring, Elizabeth George’s grandson, Richard
“Skip” Hayward, was elected president of the tribe.94  Hayward
promised to improve reservation housing and to achieve economic
independence for the tribe.95
Hayward’s grandmother often told him that the state had sto-
len the Pequots’ land.96  Encouraged by research supporting these
accounts, tribal members paid careful attention to several law-
suits instituted by the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) on
behalf of tribes claiming that their lands had been sold unlaw-
fully.97  In 1976, NARF filed a similar suit on behalf of the Pe-
quots, seeking the return of Pequot lands sold by Connecticut in
1856.98  NARF’s legal theory for the suits was based on the Non-
Intercourse Act of 1790,99 which prohibited the sale of tribal lands
without prior federal approval.100  Because Connecticut had not
obtained federal approval for the 1856 sale, NARF argued that the
lands rightly belonged to the Pequots.101  This novel legal theory
garnered enough attention and success to allow NARF to negoti-
ate a settlement with the State.102
The settlement included federal funds for the Pequots to
purchase replacement land for that which was sold in 1856, as
well as federal tribal recognition.103  After reaching the settlement
with the State, NARF similarly had to convince Congress to codify
the proposed settlement.104  In 1983, President Reagan signed into
89 Id. at 137-38.
90 Id.
91 Micah Morrison, Casino Royale: The Foxwoods Story, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2001, at
A18, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2873256 [hereinafter Morrison, Casino Royale].
92 KIM ISAAC EISLER, REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS: HOW A SMALL NATIVE AMERICAN
TRIBE CREATED THE WORLD’S MOST PROFITABLE CASINO 58 (2001).
93 Campisi, supra note 85, at 138.
94 Id.; Morrison, Casino Royale, supra note 91.
95 See Campisi, supra note 85, at 139.
96 Id. at 140.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 132, 140; see also Tribal Nation History, supra note 78.
99 Campisi, supra note 85, at 140 n.65; 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2001).
100 25 U.S.C. § 177; Morrison, Casino Royale, supra note 91; Campisi, supra note 85, at
140.  The federal approval must come in the form of treaty or convention entered into pur-
suant to the Constitution.  25 U.S.C. § 177.
101 See Campisi, supra note 85, at 132, 140.
102 Morrison, Casino Royale, supra note 91.
103 Id.
104 EISLER, supra note 92, at 85-87.
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law a bill that extinguished the Pequots’ claims to hundreds of
acres of land,105 provided nine hundred thousand dollars to the Pe-
quots to entice landowners to sell their property to the tribe for
more than its actual value,106 and gave federal recognition107 to the
Pequots.108
B. Gaming at Foxwoods
1. If You Build It, They Will Come
With the return of a significant portion of their original reser-
vation,109 the Pequots turned to other issues, particularly eco-
nomic development.  By the mid-1980s, the tribe had secured
loans to establish a successful bingo hall that generated annual
gross revenues of twenty million dollars, while attracting one
thousand visitors per day.110  After Congress passed IGRA, the Pe-
quots sought to expand their gambling enterprises to include ca-
sino-style gaming, despite opposition from state and local
governments.  In 1990, the tribe successfully argued in federal
court that because Connecticut allowed limited casino-style gam-
bling for charitable purposes, such gambling did not violate state
public policy, and thus, the tribe could open a casino on their res-
ervation.111  Although the court decision paved the way for a Tri-
bal-State compact under IGRA, the types of Class III gaming the
tribe could offer remained controversial because the state’s laws
allowing charitable gambling did not permit slot machines.112
Aware that slot machines typically generate about two-thirds of a
casino’s revenue, the tribe aggressively pursued state authoriza-
tion,113 negotiating a deal with the State for the exclusive right to
operate slot machines in exchange for a twenty-five percent state
cut of the slot revenues.114
Local lenders declined to finance the Pequots’ new, Las
Vegas-style casino.115  In 1991, the tribe, under Hayward’s leader-
ship, found a willing financier in a Malaysian construction mag-
105 25 U.S.C. § 1753.
106 Id. § 1754.
107 Id. § 1758; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-43, at 11 (1983) (noting that extension of fed-
eral recognition to a tribe through a statute was unusual, but desirable when settling
claims such as the Pequots’).
108 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-60; see also EISLER, supra note 92, at 87.
109 See Michael Taylor, Keeping Tabs on Gaming: World’s Largest Casino Mob-Free,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 30, 2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 6483374.  By 2000, the
Pequots had managed to buy about two thousand acres in the area. Id.
110 EISLER, supra note 92, at 108-10.
111 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1990).
112 EISLER, supra note 92, at 130, 178-80.
113 Id. at 179-80.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 148.
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nate turned casino operator, Lim Goh Tong.116  Lim recognized the
potential economic success of the Pequots’ venture and readily fi-
nanced a $58 million construction loan and a $175 million line of
credit to the tribe.117  In addition to interest on the two loans, Lim
would receive approximately ten percent of the casino’s adjusted
gross income until 2016.118
The Pequots’ Foxwoods Resort Casino opened its doors in
1992, and enjoyed immediate success.  Located only 110 miles
from Boston and 130 miles from New York, Foxwoods attracts
over forty thousand visitors each day.119  Foxwoods is one of the
largest casinos in the world, boasting more than 5800 slot ma-
chines, a 3200-seat high stakes bingo hall, and over 300 gaming
tables, including blackjack, roulette, craps, baccarat, keno, and
poker.120  The casino’s estimated gross revenue was $1.3 billion
dollars in 1999, and the tribe paid Connecticut close to $175 mil-
lion under the terms of its Tribal-State compact.121
Using casino revenue, the tribe offers a vast array of services
to its approximately three hundred members, as well as per capita
payments.  Each tribal member receives a payment of at least fifty
thousand dollars per year, and some members are provided with
free homes, medical care, and day care.122  Tribal members also
receive retirement payments and educational scholarships.123
Off the reservation, Foxwoods has revitalized Connecticut’s
economy, which had suffered severely following defense cut-
backs.124  Most casino patrons travel to Foxwoods from other
states, spurring a boom in construction of nearby hotels and res-
116 Id. at 149-55.




121 Id.; FRED CARSTENSEN ET AL., CONN. CTR. FOR ECON. ANALYSIS, THE ECONOMIC IM-
PACT OF THE MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION OPERATIONS ON CONNECTICUT 1 (2000).
In 2000, the combined revenue of Foxwoods and the Mohegan Sun, Connecticut’s second
tribal casino, was about $1.9 billion. See, e.g., Rick Green, With Dollars Comes Change,
HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 23, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL 25323147.  In September
2001, both casinos reported increased slot revenue over that of the previous year. Ter-
rorists Fail to Inhibit Gamblers, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 16, 2001, at A4, available at 2001 WL
22633250.
122 Jules Wagman, Indian Tribe Strikes Gold in Casino World, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, Feb. 25, 2001, at 6E, available at 2001 WL 9341261.
123 See EISLER, supra note 92, at 199.  On the Foxwoods web site, a young tribal mem-
ber is quoted as saying, “[The tribal elders] said, ‘Just pursue your education, and you’ll
have a career already set up for you.’  I’m going straight through college to get every kind of
degree I can.  And I want to be a lawyer.”  Mashantucket Pequots, Tribal Members Reflect
on the Dream, at http://www.foxwoods.com/pequots/mptn_history_dream.html (last visited
Jan. 5, 2002) (alteration in original).
124 See CARSTENSEN ET AL., supra note 121, at i (“With its diverse business enterprises
and reinvestments of capital in Connecticut, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation has
become an economic growth marvel for the State and the immediate region.”).
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taurants.125  Visitors also flock to the tribe’s Mashantucket Pequot
Museum and Indian Research Center, which attracts more than
250,000 people each year.126  The Pequots’ success has resulted in
over forty thousand new jobs in Connecticut and an impact on the
state’s economy measured in billions of dollars.127
2. The Pequots Scrutinized
Along with casino patrons, the Pequots’ nearly unrivaled suc-
cess also has attracted criticism.  Formerly sleepy New England
communities surrounding the reservation have fought hard
against the expansion of gaming, complaining of increased traffic,
pollution, crime, and bankruptcies.128  The State of Connecticut,
along with three towns near the Pequots’ reservation, filed suit in
federal court to block the tribe from acquiring more land in trust129
and, having failed that, sought congressional intervention.130  Per-
haps predictably, much of the criticism attacked the Pequots
125 Id. at 2.  Nearly three-quarters of Foxwoods’s patrons come from outside of Con-
necticut. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 4.  State revenue, received in the form of direct payments from the Pequots’
and the Mohegans’ casinos, has made money raised from legalized gambling the third-larg-
est source of revenue in Connecticut’s budget.  Lyn Bixby, Gambling Now State’s 3rd-Best
Bet, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 4554705.
128 Similar disputes are escalating in California following voter approval of Proposition
1A in March 2000, legalizing the forty or so tribal casinos that were operating at the time.
See Roger Dunstan, The Evolution and Impact of Indian Gaming in California, GAMING L.
REV. vol. 5 No. 4, at 373 (2001).  Currently, sixty-two tribes have entered into compacts
with the State.  Commentators have called tribal gaming in California potentially “the big-
gest, richest gambling industry in the world.”  James P. Sweeney, High Stakes Showdown,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 6478770.  California is
home to over one hundred federally recognized tribes, and another fifty tribes have applied
for recognition.  James P. Sweeney, Casino Cross Fire, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9,
2001, at G1, available at 2001 WL 27288042.  Residents in non-Indian communities near
rapidly expanding casinos have expressed concern about increased traffic and pollution,
and decreased water supplies.  On the Barona Indian Reservation, east of San Diego, the
tribe has planned a $225 million expansion of its casino operation, including an 18-hole golf
course, a 390-room hotel, and a 300,000 square foot casino.  The tribe’s neighbors have
complained about dry wells, plans to widen the road to accommodate more traffic, and the
tribe’s noncompliance with state and local environmental regulations. Id.; Fred Dickey,
Reversal of Fortunes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at E1, available at 2001 WL 2520109.  One
reporter called the dispute “a classic settler-Indian battle with a role reversal that spins
history into dizziness.” Id.  Public attention paid to one California tribe, the Augustine
Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians, may soon rival that of the Pequots.  The Augustine
Band, which has a single adult member, recently signed a casino development deal with a
Las Vegas company.  Mark Henry, Tribe Plans to Open Casino, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (River-
side, CA), Sept. 2, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL 27535668.
129 Although the plaintiffs were successful in district court, they lost on appeal.  Con-
necticut v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1007 (2001).  The plaintiffs argued that if the land were placed in trust, and thus, out
of the reach of state and local taxation, they would lose tens of the thousands of dollars in
tax revenues. Id. at 85.
130 Joel Lang, Reading Jeff Benedict; Should You Believe His Revelations About the
Pequots and the Making of the World’s Largest Casino?, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 3, 2000,
at 5, available at 2000 WL 30577605.
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themselves:  the tribe was too successful, and many of its members
did not fit popular conceptions of Native Americans.  Donald
Trump expressed the judgment of many when he stated that the
Pequots “don’t look like Indians to me and they don’t look like In-
dians to Indians.”131
As the first decade of the Foxwoods’s operation neared a close,
two book-length expose´s of the tribe and its casino purported to
use investigative journalism to debunk the Pequots’ status as a
tribe.  In Without Reservation,132 then-law student, Jeff Benedict,
attacked the tribe, reaching the conclusion that tribal members
were not Pequots at all; instead, he asserted, many of them were
descendants of other tribes or African Americans.133  Indeed, Ben-
edict said that while writing the book, “I didn’t believe I was writ-
ing about Indians.  I was writing about imposters.”134  The
Pequots, as Benedict tells it, were able to hoodwink lawyers and
politicians to falsely obtain tribal recognition for the sole purpose
of exploiting laws allowing Indian gaming.135  In Without Reserva-
tion’s epilogue, Benedict called for Congress to reinvestigate the
tribe’s authenticity based on the information presented in the
book.136  Some reviewers criticized Benedict’s journalism, but it
nevertheless “won instant credibility.”137  Benedict’s book made
him a hero in non-Indian communities in Connecticut, reported
the Boston Globe.138 Without Reservation was included on a Led-
yard High School reading list,139 and some area residents said
Benedict should run for President.140
131 Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 521 (1994) (quoting
Federal Officials Refute Trump Allegations, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 1993); see also EISLER,
supra note 92, at 207.
132 JEFF BENEDICT, WITHOUT RESERVATION: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL
INDIAN TRIBE AND FOXWOODS, THE WORLD’S LARGEST CASINO (2000).  Benedict’s book report-
edly has been optioned for a Hollywood film.  Lang, supra note 130.
133 BENEDICT, supra note 132, at 144-50.  Benedict’s book opens with the story of future
Pequot tribal chair Skip Hayward filing for a marriage license in 1969 and choosing to
identify himself as “white” rather than “Indian.” Id. at 1-4.
134 Lang, supra note 130.
135 BENEDICT, supra note 132, at 109-17.
136 Id. at 353; see also Jeff Benedict, This Land Is Not Your Land, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 10, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 30579027.
137 Lang, supra note 130.  For example, Lang noted Benedict’s conceit of recreating
past events in unlikely detail.
Most incredibly, he claimed in the book’s bibliography to have done some 650 in-
terviews and obtained 50,000 pages of documents from town halls, libraries,
archives and courts.  He had begun his research in June 1998 and finished writing
his 358-page book 21 months later.  He had done all this work while enrolled in
the New England School of Law . . . .
Id.
138 Ellen Barry, Lineage Questions Linger as Gaming Wealth Grows, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 12, 2000, at A19, available at 2000 WL 3355289 [hereinafter Barry, Lineage].
139 Barry, Geneologies, supra note 48.
140 Barry, Lineage, supra note 138.
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Kim Isaac Eisler’s Revenge of the Pequots141 expressed similar
doubts about the Pequots’ legitimacy, although couched in per-
haps slightly milder rhetoric.142  Eisler’s story similarly focused on
the Pequots’ success using federal law and procedure to their fi-
nancial advantage; yet as the book’s title indicates, Eisler sug-
gested that turnabout may be fair play for a group nearly wiped
out by colonization.143  Nevertheless, in explaining his motivation
for writing the book, Eisler stated that he had heard “that the
whole thing was a giant scam and that Chief ‘Skip’ Hayward and
his band were nothing but imposters.”144  Eisler concluded that the
Pequots had unfairly used laws meant to benefit “real” tribes,
“creat[ing] a new modern-day paradigm that changed the face of
the country—not Native American, but Casino-American.”145  In
an article accompanying the release of Revenge of the Pequots,
Eisler implied that the answer to the problem of the Pequots may
be a return to forced assimilation.146
The comments of local residents, fueled by Benedict’s and
Eisler’s books, and the national media attention they generated,147
141 EISLER, supra note 92.
142 As one reviewer put it, Eisler’s book “lacks some of the gratuitous detail (and the
sensationalism) of [Benedict’s book] . . . .  Mr. Eisler retains a healthy skepticism about the
Mashantucket quest for tribal recognition, while sympathizing with the desire of a group of
perennial have-nots to strike it rich when the law gave them an opening.”  Philip Burnham,
The Enterprising Pequots and How Their Casinos Enraged, Grew, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2001, at B8 (book review), available at 2001 WL 4146689.  The Washington Post called
Eisler “a thorough reporter.” Jonathan Yardley, A Game of Three-Card Monte?, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at C2 (book review), available at 2001 WL 2542126.  Additionally, the
Boston Globe proclaimed Eisler’s book “free of such dirt . . . .  Unlike the case with Bene-
dict’s work, one need not ponder the sources or veracity of material contained in Eisler’s
work.”  Sean P. Murphy, Well-Told Tale of a Battle Against the Odds, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
12, 2001, at B8 (book review), available at 2001 WL 3923559.
143 Kim Isaac Eisler, Why I Wrote a Book About a Tribe that Hit the Jackpot, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 4552543.  Eisler refers to the Pequots
as a “tribe”—in quotation marks—explaining that “whether or not you accept their geneal-
ogy, the ‘tribe’ had been lost.” Id.
144 Id.  To Eisler himself, it seemed “slightly unlikely” that there were Native Ameri-
cans in Connecticut at the turn of the twenty-first century. Id.
145 EISLER, supra note 92, at 242.
146 Eisler, supra note 143.  Eisler explained:
Gale Norton, the new secretary of the interior, is a prote´ge´ and disciple of James
Watt.  It was Watt who successfully urged President Reagan to veto the Pequot
recognition bill in 1983.  Watt not only believed that no new federal reservations
should be created, he would have been delighted to close down the existing ones
and to integrate American Indians into mainstream American society.  I suspect
Norton shares that view.
Id.
147 A Wall Street Journal review of Eisler’s Revenge of the Pequots concluded, “Bet by
bet, the Indians are scalping customers for millions.”  Allan T. Demaree, Betting on a Ca-
sino, and Winning Big, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2001, at A20 (book review), available at 2001
WL-WSJ 2853644.  An editorial in the Providence Journal asserted that the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe “is essentially a creation of the casino, rather than the other way around,
insofar as the tribe had only a few active members until it hit the political lottery with its
casino privilege.”  Powell, supra note 11; see also Bill Bell, Against All Odds: How Conn.’s
Pequot Tribe Hit the Jackpot, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2001, at 20 (book review), availa-
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revealed the economic underpinnings of the “authenticity” ques-
tion.148  One resident referred to the Pequots as “a shake-and-bake
and fabricated tribe,”149 while another explained that “it’s hard for
people like us, who are working our butts off . . . .  They never had
a pot to pee in, and all of a sudden they’re driving in $40,000
cars.”150  An attorney for Upstate Citizens for Equality, a grass-
roots organization of non-Indian homeowners in New York, called
the Pequots “an emblem of what’s wrong with the whole operation
. . . .  In the 1980s, if someone said ‘Indian,’ people would think of a
picture of a guy with a tear running down his face, caring for the
environment.  If you say Indians now they think of casinos.”151
Benedict himself recalled his impression upon first visiting the
Pequot reservation in 1998:  “I saw $40,000 vehicles, but I didn’t
see an Indian tribe.”152  Eisler, too, noted that “the amount of
money being tossed around on the reservation is obscene,” con-
cluding that “[i]f the Pequots and Foxwoods have been victimized
by negative public attitudes, it is in part their own gaudy success
that is the culprit.”153
If one end of the spectrum is defined by the perceived inter-
sections of tribal authenticity and newfound wealth in the Pequot
Model of tribal gaming, then the Plains Model lies at the other end
of the spectrum on both counts; tribal authenticity is not likely
open to serious challenge, while relative wealth is a virtual non-
issue in the rural confines of North Dakota.  As is the case with
the genesis of the Pequot Model, the histories of North Dakota’s
tribes provide the foundation for the Plains Model of tribal
gaming.
ble at 2001 WL 4676962 (calling Eisler’s book “a terrific story, with dramatic twists, politi-
cal intrigues, hints of major mischief, shadowy manipulators, an unlikely rescuer and
barrels and barrels of tax-free cash”); Bob Dowling, The Making of a Casino Nation, BUS.
WK., Mar. 12, 2001, at 22E4 (book review), available at  2001 WL 2205813; Wagman, supra
note 122 (“[T]he impoverished, nearly extinct Pequots became a tribe that can stand up,
dollar for dollar, to any Arab oil shiekdom.”); Jonathan Yardley, Success Story or a Scam?,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at 15 (book review), available at 2001 WL 7218816.
148 In their briefs accompanying a federal lawsuit, the State of Connecticut and the
towns of Ledyard, North Stonington, and Preston similarly juxtaposed the Pequots’ wealth
with their “Indianness” in arguing that the tribe should be barred from acquiring further
trust lands. See generally Connecticut v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d 82 (2d
Cir. 2000).  As the Second Circuit explained, “The Connecticut plaintiffs contend that the
Indian canon of construction has no application in this case—not to these Indians—because
of the Mashantucket Pequots’ tremendous wealth.” Id. at 92.  The court went on to reject
the argument, reasoning that tribal disadvantage was not a prerequisite to application of
familiar doctrines of federal Indian law and, even if it were, the Pequots were sufficiently
disadvantaged at the time the statute in question was enacted. Id. at 92-93.
149 Barry, Lineage, supra note 138.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Lang, supra note 130.  Indeed, Benedict characterized the tribe as a “Goliath,” with
the nearby towns and Connecticut being “David.” Id.  “They all were inferior in terms of
power and ability to the Mashantucket tribe . . . .” Id.
153 Eisler, supra note 143.
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IV. THE PLAINS MODEL154
A. History
Upon arriving in the Great Plains of middle America, Euro-
pean explorers dubbed the area “the Great American Desert,” be-
lieving that the Plains could not sustain human life.155  They were
wrong, of course.  Archaeological evidence indicates that humans
inhabited the Great Plains as early as twelve thousand years
ago.156  Several different Native American tribes have resided in
what is now North Dakota, including the Assiniboin, Chippewa,
Mandan, Hidatsa, Arikara, Cheyenne, Yanktonai, Cree, Dakota,
and Lakota.157
Today, North Dakota’s five reservations encompass nearly
five million acres158 and are home to approximately thirty thou-
sand tribal members of the Standing Rock Sioux, the Spirit Lake
Nation Sioux, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, the Three Affiliated
Tribes, and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa.  Each of the
state’s five tribes operates a casino on reservation lands in North
Dakota.
1. The Great Sioux Nation
The Sioux, who called themselves Dakota,159 were a confeder-
ation of seven tribes:  the Mdewakanton, Wahpeton, Wapekute,
Sisseton, Yankton, Yanktonai, and the Teton (also known as
Lakota).160  As early colonists achieved military dominance over
tribes in the East, including the Pequots, the Great Sioux Nation
strengthened its own intertribal government and developed an
154 The development and discussion of the “Plains Model” is based on the model
introduced by Rand and Light.  Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes, supra note 36, at 336-39.
155 MARY JANE SCHNEIDER, NORTH DAKOTA INDIANS:  AN INTRODUCTION 55 (1994).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 69.
158 Although North Dakota has five reservations within the state’s borders, technically
there are only four North Dakota tribes: the Spirit Lake Nation Sioux, Standing Rock
Sioux, Three Affiliated Tribes, and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa.  The fifth reserva-
tion, that of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, straddles the North Dakota-South Dakota bor-
der, but the tribe is considered a South Dakota tribe because its tribal government offices
are located in that state. Id. at 137.  I include the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe because
it operates a casino in North Dakota.
159 Although tribes occupying three of North Dakota’s five reservations are commonly
referred to as Sioux, this is something of a misnomer.  The “Seven Council Fires” tribes—
the Dakota, Lakota, and Yankton-Yanktonai (sometimes referred to as Nakota)—made up
the Great Dakota Nation. Id. at 78-79.  The tribes called themselves “kota” or allies. Id.;
Clair Jacobson, A History of the Yanktonai and Hunkpatina Sioux, 47 N.D. HISTORY, Win-
ter 1980, at 4 n.5.  “Sioux” is a French derivation of a Chippewa word used to refer to the
Dakota, “Natowesiwok,” which means “enemies” or “snakes.” Id.  The French, who encoun-
tered the Chippewa before the Dakota, heard the word as “Nadouessioux,” which they
shortened to “Sioux.” Id.
160 CONRAD W. LEIFUR, OUR STATE NORTH DAKOTA 139-40 (1953); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
NORTH DAKOTA INDIANS: TRIBES, NATIONS, TREATIES OF THE PLAINS AND WEST 96 (2001)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
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economy based largely on buffalo hunting.161  Western explorers
encountered Sioux in the Devil’s Lake region of north central
North Dakota around 1738.162
By the early 1800s, the Sioux dominated a large part of the
Midwest, including what is now North and South Dakota.163  The
latter half of the nineteenth century brought the invasion of white
settlers into Sioux lands and marked a turning point for the Great
Sioux Nation.  In 1868, the Sioux, under the leadership of Red
Cloud, entered into a treaty with the United States, in which the
federal government promised that settlers would enter Sioux ter-
ritory only with tribal consent in exchange for the Nation’s prom-
ise to cease raiding American forts.164  Under the terms of the
treaty, the Sioux retained a large portion of land, equivalent to the
size of present-day South Dakota, just west of the Missouri
River.165  In the 1870s, however, gold was discovered in the Black
Hills, prompting the federal government to breach the terms of
the treaty, and leading to an all-out war between the Sioux Nation
and the United States.166  Although the Sioux won the infamous
Battle of Little Big Horn against Colonel George Custer, the fed-
eral government succeeded in exhausting the tribes’ resources.167
In 1876, the Sioux surrendered the Black Hills and forcibly were
relocated onto reservations established by the federal
government.168
Currently, the Spirit Lake Sioux Nation, formerly known as
the Devils Lake Sioux, is located on a reservation in northeastern
North Dakota, between Devils Lake to the north, and the Chey-
enne River to the south.  Just fifteen miles south of the City of
Devils Lake, the Spirit Lake reservation is nearer to an urban
area than any other reservation in North Dakota.169  The reserva-
tion is approximately 405 square miles, and home to many of the
tribe’s over five thousand enrolled members.170  Located in the
south-central part of the state, the Standing Rock reservation
161 See EDWARD H. SPICER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 82-
84 (1969).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 84.
164 Id. at 85.
165 ELWYN B. ROBINSON, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 104 (1966).
166 SPICER, supra note 161, at 85.
167 ROBINSON, supra note 165, at 178.
168 Id.
169 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 139.  For a brief description of the tribe’s reserva-
tion, see Mni Sose Intertribal Water Rights Coalition, Inc., Spirit Lake Tribe Community
Environmental Profile, at http://www.mnisose.org/profiles/splake.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2002).
170 Spirit Lake Nation, at http://www.spiritlakenation.com/about.htm (last updated
Aug. 27, 2001).  The tribe owns 26,283 acres; allotted trust lands comprise 34,026 acres; fee
land comprises 184,451 acres; and 375 acres are owned by either the state or federal gov-
ernment. Id.
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straddles the North Dakota-South Dakota border.  The reserva-
tion is about forty miles south of Bismarck, the nearest urban area
and North Dakota’s state capital.171  The Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe has an enrolled membership of over ten thousand,172 and its
reservation covers a total area of 2.3 million acres, approximately
half of which is owned by the tribe.173  The Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe is located on the Lake Traverse reservation in south-
eastern North Dakota.  The reservation spans five counties in
South Dakota and two counties in North Dakota, covering 250,000
acres, with about one-tenth of the acreage tribally owned.174  The
tribe has over ten thousand enrolled tribal members.175
2. Three Affiliated Tribes
The Three Affiliated Tribes are the Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Tribes.  When encountered by European explorers in
1738,176 the Mandan had a population of about fifteen thousand
living in “six large, well-fortified villages along the Missouri
River.”177  According to anthropologists, the Mandan may have
come to what is now North Dakota as early as the fourteenth cen-
tury when they moved west from the Mississippi Valley, and then
up along the Missouri.178  The Hidatsa became close allies with the
Mandan in the seventeenth century when they moved from the
Red River Valley to the Missouri River, near the Mandan vil-
lages.179  The Sioux pushed the Arikara northward to the Dakotas
during the 1700s,180 and the tribe eventually settled in a village
abandoned by the Mandan after a smallpox epidemic in the
1830s.181  In 1850, the Arikara joined the Mandan and Hidatsa at
Fort Berthold.182  The Three Affiliated Tribes’ reservation origi-
nally was established by the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, which
granted the tribes over twelve million acres; it was reduced by
171 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 147.  For a brief description of the tribe, its history,
and its reservation, see Mni Sose Intertribal Water Rights Coalition, Inc., Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe Community Environmental Profile, at http://www.mnisose.org/profiles/strock.
htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter, Sioux Tribe Environmental Profile].
172 Sioux Tribe Environmental Profile, supra note 171.
173 Id.
174 Mni Sose Intertribal Water Rights Coalition, Inc., Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe
Community Environmental Profile, at http://www.mnisose.org/profiles/sisseton.htm (last
visited Jan. 7, 2002).
175 Id.
176 Pierre Verendrye (1665-1749), a French-Canadian fur trader, arrived in North Da-
kota in 1738, and was the first known white man to visit the area. LEIFUR, supra note 160,
at 147.
177 Id. at 111; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 160, at 6.
178 ROBINSON, supra note 165, at 20.
179 Id. at 23.
180 LEIFUR, supra note 160, at 133.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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1870 and 1880 executive orders to less than three million acres,
and then again through allotment.183
Currently, the Three Affiliated Tribes are located on the Fort
Berthold reservation, along the Missouri River in west-central
North Dakota.  The creation of Lake Sakakawea by the damming
of the Missouri River permanently flooded over 150,000 acres on
the reservation.184  Along with the inundated land, the tribes lost
natural resources, long-established population centers, and farms
and ranches located along the fertile Missouri River bottom-
lands.185  Presently, the reservation consists of 981,215 acres,186
and is located about seventy-five miles from Minot.  The tribal
government is headquartered in New Town, North Dakota, and
the tribes’ combined membership is about 8400.187
3. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
The Chippewa Tribe, also called the Ojibway, was one of the
largest tribes north of Mexico in the seventeenth century.188  Orig-
inally from the area that is now Wisconsin, the Chippewa were
forced westward to Minnesota by white settlement.189  French
Jesuits visited the Chippewa in 1642, when they resided on the
shores of both Lake Huron and Lake Superior.190  At the beginning
of the eighteenth century, some Chippewa moved further west
into what is now North Dakota, establishing hunting grounds
along the Red River and just west of the Turtle Mountains.191  The
Chippewa fought against the United States in the Plains Indian
Wars until the conflict was resolved through a treaty with the fed-
eral government in 1815.192  The treaty set aside reservations for
the Chippewa in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Da-
kota.193  The 1861 federal law establishing the Dakota Territory
also set aside ten million acres for Chippewa tribes as well as the
Metis in northeastern North Dakota.  Although other Chippewa
tribes negotiated smaller reservations with the federal govern-
183 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 142.
184 MHA Nation, Garrison Dam, at http://www.mhanation.com/history/garrison_dam.
shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Garrison Dam].  For a recent discussion of
the legal issues raised by the building of the Garrison Dam, see Raymond Cross, Tribes as
Rich Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 962-80 (2000).
185 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 143; see also Garrison Dam, supra note 184.
186 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 142-43.
187 Id.  For a brief description of the tribe, its history, and its reservation, see Mni Sose
Intertribal Water Rights Coalition, Inc., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Commu-
nity Environmental Profile, at http://www.mnisose.org/profiles/3affl.htm (last visited Jan.
7, 2002).
188 ROBINSON, supra note 165, at 26.
189 LEIFUR, supra note 160, at 140.
190 ROBINSON, supra note 165, at 26.
191 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 160, at 143.
192 Id. at 144.
193 Id.
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ment once the Dakota Territory was opened to white settlement,
the Turtle Mountain Band held fast.  In 1892, the tribe negotiated
an agreement with the federal government in which the tribe re-
ceived payment for the land taken under the 1861 law.194
The Turtle Mountain reservation is located just south of the
Canadian border in north-central North Dakota, about 150 miles
from Grand Forks.  The present reservation consists of about
thirty-four thousand acres, most of it individually owned; the tribe
has also acquired another thirty-five thousand acres off the reser-
vation.195  The Turtle Mountain Band is the state’s largest tribe,
with some twenty-eight thousand members.196  About seventeen
thousand members live on or near the reservation.197  Belcourt,
North Dakota, is home to the tribal government and, with a popu-
lation of about two thousand, is the state’s largest Native Ameri-
can community.198
4. Commonalities
The histories of North Dakota’s tribes reveal several common-
alities that define and shape their contemporary experiences, in-
cluding those concerning tribal gaming.  First, the federal
government recognized each of North Dakota’s tribes as a sover-
eign nation during the settlement era of the nineteenth century.
Tribes like those in North Dakota are commonly called “treaty
tribes,” referencing the government-to-government relations of
the tribes and United States during this time.  This strong tradi-
tion of tribal sovereignty continues to shape the tribes’ priorities
and interactions with state and federal government.199
194 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 151-52.  This notorious agreement is sometimes
called the “Ten Cent Treaty” because the federal government’s payment to the tribe was
the equivalent of ten cents per acre of illegally taken land.  Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, at http://www.fema.gov/reg-viii/
tribal/turtlebg.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Turtle Mountain Band].  In the
1980s, the federal government formally acknowledged the unfairness of the agreement. Id.
195 See Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 194.
196 Id.
197 Robert Lattergrass, Guest Lecture in Indian Gaming Law at the University of
North Dakota School of Law (Mar. 20, 2001) (speaker’s notes on file with Chapman Law
Review).
198 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 154.  For a brief description of the tribe’s reserva-
tion, see Mni Sose Intertribal Water Rights Coalition, Inc., Turtle Mountain Band of Chip-
pewa Indians Community Environmental Profile, at http://www.mnisose.org/profiles/
turtlemt.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2002).
199 For example, the Spirit Lake Nation has claimed ownership of a lake and surround-
ing property in northeastern North Dakota based on an 1867 treaty with the federal gov-
ernment.  Jack Sullivan, Court May Revive Ownership Lawsuit, GRAND FORKS HERALD,
Mar. 25, 2001.  The Standing Rock Sioux tribe was party to a nearly half-billion-dollar
judgment against the federal government over the ownership of the Black Hills.  See, e.g.,
K. Marie Porterfield, Fort Peck Sioux Vote to Accept Black Hills Money, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Dec. 8, 1997, at A1, available at 1997 WL 18363426.  Additionally, some North
Dakota tribes have refused to comply with federal laws that they believe illegally compro-
mise tribal sovereignty. See Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 194.
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Second, the tribes in North Dakota are land-based, their res-
ervations originally established by treaty.  Economic opportunities
available to the tribes are governed in large part by the resources,
natural or otherwise, located on reservation land.  As the histories
of North Dakota’s tribes indicate, reservations typically were lo-
cated in areas perceived to be devoid of resources useful to white
settlers.  Unsurprisingly, then, there has been little or no access to
commercial enterprises on the state’s reservations, and few oppor-
tunities to market goods or services produced on-reservation to
non-Native populations.
Third, as is typical of tribal reservations in the Great Plains,
North Dakota’s reservations consist of mostly small communities
removed from urban areas.  In the recent past, tribal communities
have lacked commercial development much beyond a local grocery
store, and some homes have gone without even basic services,
such as electricity, running water, or telephone service.200  Still,
each of the state’s tribes has a membership numbering in the
thousands, many of whom grew up on and continue to reside on
the reservation.  Yet the scarcity of opportunities in North Da-
kota’s tribal communities have led many tribal members to seek
education or employment off the reservation.
As a result of the economic constraints faced by the state’s
tribes, North Dakota’s reservations historically have been among
the poorest localities in the nation. In the early 1990s, unemploy-
ment rates on the state’s reservations were staggering, reaching
over eighty percent in some areas,201 even as the rest of the state
experienced low unemployment rates, mirroring the generally ro-
bust national economy.202  As one tribal member said, “[It’s h]ard
to see these statistics; [it’s] harder to live them.”203  Typically, tri-
bal members living on the reservation are “[p]eople who grew up
in poverty and just don’t have anything at all.”204
B. Gaming on the Great Plains
In the early 1990s, tribes in North Dakota turned to casino
gaming as a means to alleviate poverty, provide jobs, improve gov-
ernment services, leverage economic development, and entice tri-
bal members to return to the reservation.  In 1992, Governor
George Sinner signed Tribal-State compacts allowing the state’s
200 SCHNEIDER, supra note 155, at 155.
201 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS OF NORTH DAKOTA TRI-
BALLY OWNED CASINOS  3 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N].
202 In the first half of the 1990s, state unemployment ranged from three to six percent.
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, North Dakota, at
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
203 Lattergrass, supra note 197.
204 Id.
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tribes to conduct Class III gaming.205  Currently, there are five tri-
bal casino developments in North Dakota:  the Four Bears Casino
and Lodge near New Town,206 owned by the Three Affiliated
Tribes; the Sky Dancer Hotel and Casino in Belcourt,207 owned by
the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians; the Spirit Lake
Casino and Resort in Spirit Lake,208 owned by the Spirit Lake
Sioux Tribe; the Prairie Knights Casino and Resort in Fort
Yates,209 owned by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe; and the Dakota
Magic Casino and Hotel in Hankinson,210 owned by the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Sioux Tribe.211  In contrast to the experiences of many
tribes, each of the tribal casinos in North Dakota is owned, oper-
ated, and controlled by the tribal government.212
Each of the tribes considers its casino a success, despite their
profits being a far cry from those of the Pequots’ Foxwoods.213  The
varied economic success of tribal casinos is not surprising.  Even
before the spread of Class III gaming following IGRA’s enactment,
the profits of tribal bingo halls had been determined largely by
205 The 1992 compacts were scheduled to expire in 2002, but in 1999, the state’s five
gaming tribes negotiated uniform ten-year compacts with the state.  David Melmer, North
Dakota Tribes Score a Coup with Gaming Compacts, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Dec. 20,
1999, available at 1999 WL 28719359.  Under the terms of the compacts, ten percent of the
tribes’ Class III gaming revenue is directed toward diversified tribal economic develop-
ment. Id.  The new compacts, signed by then-Governor Ed Schafer, take effect in 2002.
Under the new compacts, tribes may raise their betting limits and offer roulette and slot
machine tournaments.  Dale Wetzel, Tribes Reach Gambling Pact: Feds Must Approve Deal
Before It’s Final, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Sept. 4, 1999, at 4.  Aside from continuing tribal
gaming’s positive economic impacts on the state of North Dakota, the impetus behind the
negotiation of the new compacts was to allow the tribes to obtain long-term financing nec-
essary to diversify tribal economic enterprises, particularly through tourism. Id.; see also
Brian Witte, Tribal Chairmen Say Compacts Helped Casinos, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Nov.
21, 2000, at 8A.
206 See Four Bears Casino & Lodge, Location, at http://www.4bearscasino.com (last up-
dated Mar. 1, 2002).
207 See Sky Dancer Hotel and Casino, at http://www.skydancercasino.com (last visited
Mar. 23, 2002).
208 See Spirit Lake Casino and Resort, at http://www.spiritlakecasino.com (last visited
Jan. 7, 2002).
209 See Prairie Knights Casino and Resort, at http://www.prairieknights.com (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2002).
210 See Dakota Magic Casino and Hotel, at http://www.dakotamagic.com (last visited
Mar. 19, 2002).
211 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 201, at 1.
212 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS OF NORTH DAKOTA TRI-
BALLY OWNED CASINOS 3 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N].  Each of the
state’s gaming tribes belongs to the North Dakota Indian Gaming Association, as well as
the regional Great Plains Indian Gaming Association. See generally Great Plains Indian
Gaming Association, at http://gpiga.org/home.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).  Both as-
sociations work with the National Indian Gaming Association to influence tribal gaming
policy on state and federal levels, as well as to share information and expertise among
tribes. See generally National Indian Gaming Association, at http://www.indiangaming.org
(last visited Jan. 7, 2002).
213 See generally 1998 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 212, at 13.
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access to metropolitan markets.214  Nevertheless, many tribes fac-
ing dire socio-economic conditions opted for even the modest in-
creases in employment and revenue accompanying gaming in a
rural market.  As Mark Fox, a member of the Three Affiliated
Tribes and secretary of the National Indian Gaming Association,
put it, the success of Indian gaming in North Dakota is reflected
in increased reservation employment.215  For the Three Affiliated
Tribes, the casino has helped to slash reservation unemployment
from seventy percent to approximately thirty percent.216  On the
Standing Rock Sioux reservation, the tribe’s casino created 356
gaming-related jobs for Native Americans, significantly cutting
the tribe’s nearly ninety percent unemployment rate.217  Indeed,
the tribe’s casino is the county’s largest employer.218  Similarly,
the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa’s casino has created 360
new jobs on the reservation.219  Together, the state’s five tribal
casinos have directly created more than two thousand jobs,220 over
eighty percent of which are held by Native Americans.221
Even relatively modest casino revenue may allow a tribe to
diversify economic development.  The Standing Rock Sioux, for ex-
ample, have launched several casino-related businesses, including
a hotel, RV park, and marina,222 while the Three Affiliated Tribes
are starting data entry and manufactured homes businesses.223
The Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa has used gaming revenue
to finance a start-up data entry business, and currently is pursu-
214 Eduardo E. Cordeiro, The Economics of Bingo: Factors Influencing the Success of
Bingo Operations on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES
AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 205, 234 (Stephen Cornell
& Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1993).  If the population density surrounding a tribal casino is low,
there is little chance that the casino will bring significant “new” income for the tribe. Id.
The proximity of competing casinos and the regional propensity to gambling also influence
casino success. Id.
215 Mark Fox, Guest Lecture in Indian Gaming Law at the University of North Dakota
School of Law 4 (Apr. 24, 2001) (transcript on file with Chapman Law Review).
216 Id.  Fox explained, “We have young people [for] the first time in their lives learning
about work ethic[;] [l]earning . . . what even . . . a basic checking account is all about.  We
have people [who] are financing homes and cars.  For the first time they have been able to
do these positive things.” Id.
217 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 32-33 (reporting that in 1995, one year after the
tribe opened its casino, reservation unemployment dropped to less than thirty percent, but
noting that the degree of reduction may have been due in part to different tribal data collec-
tion procedures); see also Timothy Egan, American Indians Restoring Plains Life, GRAND
FORKS HERALD, May 28, 2001, at 1A.  The tribe’s casino also created another 123 jobs for
non-Indians in 1997. CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 32.
218 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 49.
219 Lattergrass, supra note 197.
220 The Prairie Knights Casino employs 470 full-time workers, while the Four Bears,
Sky Dancer and Spirit Lake Casinos each employ 400 full-time workers.  Furthermore, the
Dakota Magic Casino employs 375 full-time workers.  Dorreen Yellow Bird, Researcher
Says Gambling is a Net Plus on Reservations, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Sept. 3, 2000, at 2C.
221 1998 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 212, at 5.
222 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 39.
223 Fox, supra note 215.
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ing recycling and construction companies, as well as tourism-re-
lated businesses.224
In addition, even relatively modest casino revenues and levels
of casino employment benefit surrounding non-Indian communi-
ties, as well as the state economy.  In North Dakota, the five tribal
casinos have a total annual payroll exceeding thirty million dol-
lars each year.225  Many workers employed at the casinos previ-
ously were unemployed and receiving public assistance.226
According to calculations using economic multipliers,227 the an-
nual economic benefits to the state resulting from the casinos’
payroll and purchases totals nearly $125,000,000, making tribal
gaming one of North Dakota’s top two economic engines.228  The
cumulative benefits of Indian gaming in the state are striking.
Since 1997, North Dakota has accrued nearly five hundred million
dollars in economic benefits resulting from Indian gaming.229
Revenue can revitalize communities as well as economies.  In
North Dakota, none of the tribes disburses casino revenue in the
form of per capita payments;230 instead, profits from the tribal
casinos allow the state’s tribes to provide essential government
services to their members.231  Increasing employment opportuni-
ties and available government services has had the almost imme-
diate effect of enticing tribal members to return to the
224 Lattergrass, supra note 197.
225 2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 201, at 3.
226 1998 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 212, at 5.  The North Dakota Indian
Gaming Association estimates that thirty to forty percent of new hires at the tribal casinos
previously were either unemployed or receiving public assistance.  Dorreen Yellow Bird,
How Gaming Pays Off, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Apr. 1, 2001, at 1D (quoting Alan Austad,
consultant to the North Dakota Indian Gaming Association).  Other states, such as Wiscon-
sin, have experienced similar reductions in public entitlements payments as a direct result
of tribal gaming. See Casinos Cut Welfare Rolls in Some Tribes, GRAND FORKS HERALD,
Sept. 2, 2000, at 3A.
227 The 2000 North Dakota Indian Gaming Association report categorizes the economic
impacts of tribal gaming in the state according to direct and secondary impacts.  Direct
impacts “are those changes in output, employment, or income that represent the initial or
direct effects” of gaming.  2000 N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 201, at 11.  Secon-
dary impacts “result from subsequent rounds of spending and respending within the econ-
omy.” Id.  For example, an employee may use a dollar of wages to buy a loaf of bread at a
local grocer.  The grocer then may use part of that dollar to buy more bread, while the
bread supplier may in turn use part of that dollar to purchase wheat, and so on. Id.
228 Id. at 7.
229 Id. at 9.
230 Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes, supra note 36, at 338.  As Mark Fox explains, the
Three Affiliated Tribes’ annual casino profits of approximately three million dollars would
result in a per capita payment for each of the tribe’s ten thousand or so members of about
three hundred dollars.  Thus, the tribe has decided that the casino revenue is best spent
providing services to its members. Id.
231 For example, the Three Affiliated Tribes use casino revenue to provide members
with day-care services and educational scholarships, as well as to improve the tribe’s waste
disposal system and other conservation efforts. Id.
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reservations in North Dakota.232  As the state struggles to main-
tain its general population, its Native American population grew
by twenty percent during the last decade.233
As the Boston Globe series indicated, tribes like those in
North Dakota, with large memberships and little access to metro-
politan markets, are unlikely to experience dramatic economic
and social rejuvenation based solely on casino revenues.234  Two
thousand new casino jobs can significantly lessen tribal unem-
ployment, but cannot cure it.235  For example, the Turtle Mountain
Band’s casino created 360 jobs on the reservation, but with some
twenty-eight thousand members, most of whom live on or near the
reservation, the tribe must continue to combat poverty and
unemployment.236
Nevertheless, the accuracy of the Globe’s analysis stops there.
From the tribes’ perspective, casino employment and revenue pro-
vide the necessary foundation for tribal strategies to overcome res-
ervation poverty and accompanying social ills.237  By allowing
232 Id. (“More people are coming back from urban areas partially because of the casi-
nos.  There are new job and educational opportunities, better health benefits, and fresh
ideas out there [on the reservations].”) (quoting Cornelius Grant, executive director of
North Dakota’s Rural Development Council and a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa) (alterations in original).
233 Discover ND, Census: Population by Race 1990 & 2000, at http://www.state.nd.us/
jsnd/Bin/lmidata.pl (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).  During the 1990s, North Dakota’s Native
American population increased from 25,917 to 31,329, while its white population decreased
from 604,142 to 593,181. Id.  Only six counties in North Dakota gained residents during
the 1990s; three of those counties are populated primarily by Native Americans.  Timothy
Egan, As Others Abandon Plains, Indians and Bison Come Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/27/national/27FRON.html?pagewanted=
print; see also Carson Walker, Culture, New Wealth Lure Indians Home, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, Apr. 11, 2001, at 3A.  Other states, too, have seen Native Americans returning to
live on the reservation due in part to increased employment opportunities created by tribal
casinos. See, e.g., Mike Johnson, Casinos, Jobs Lure Indians Back to Better Lives on Reser-
vations, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 2001, at 1A, available at 2001 WL 9353282 (re-
porting that in Wisconsin, reservation populations increased by over twenty percent
between 1990 and 2000).
234 The reasons for this extend beyond the rural nature of tribal communities, shared
by non-Native localities throughout states like North Dakota.
[T]ribal governments cope with two challenges that non-Indian governments do
not face.  First, they must operate between the institutions of Indian culture and
those of the larger society, balancing competing values while being constrained by
differing norms.  Second, tribal governments contend with staggering social condi-
tions the likes of which are found in few other places in America.
CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
235 See Yellow Bird, supra note 220 (explaining that as the tribal population increases,
it becomes more difficult for the tribal government to provide adequate employment for
tribal members).
236 Lattergrass, supra note 197.  The tribe’s poverty rate remains high at forty percent,
while unemployment continues to exceed fifty percent. Id.
237 See CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 53.
For the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (and other tribes similarly situated), the incre-
mental revenue is certainly helpful, especially given the difficulty it has had devel-
oping other enterprises and the limited availability of federal funding.  However,
the effect of gaming on social conditions will be limited until such tribes can lever
gaming business experience into other forms of economic development.”
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tribal governments to offer their members employment and educa-
tional opportunities, along with essential government services
such as adequate housing and health care, gaming revenue has
demonstrably strengthened tribal governments in North Dakota.
This, in turn, has helped to preserve tribal sovereignty, because
tribes have the economic wherewithal to implement tribal govern-
ment decisions and programs.  Casino profits also allow tribes to
diminish their dependence on state and federal programs, further
reinforcing tribal sovereignty.238
Like its counterpart, the Pequot Model, the Plains Model of
tribal gaming convincingly demonstrates the oversimplification
and lacunae in conventional narratives of Indian gaming.  Such
accounts threaten to set the terms of contemporary political dis-
course and mediate policy outcomes, creating a lose-lose proposi-
tion for tribes from the Pequots to the Plains, and elsewhere.
V. TOWARD INFORMED POLICYMAKING
A. Misinformed Policymaking
Despite well-reasoned criticism that application of federal law
and policy to tribal gaming is, by definition, an infringement on
tribal sovereignty,239 the political reality remains that Congress,
by virtue of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the commerce
power,240 has constitutional authority to regulate Native American
tribes in the United States.  Congress has misused this power in
the past, with dire consequences for tribes.  Most recently, how-
ever, the federal government has adopted a policy of tribal self-
determination, aimed at encouraging reservation economic devel-
opment and strengthening tribal governments, while decreasing
federal aid to Native American communities.  Although the fed-
eral government’s self-determination policy is not above criticism,
Id.
238 See, e.g, Telephone Interview by Samuel Jandt with J. Kurt Luger, Executive Direc-
tor, North Dakota Indian Gaming Association (Nov. 23, 2001) (notes on file with Chapman
Law Review) [hereinafter Luger Telephone Interview] (stating that North Dakota tribes
use casino revenue to fund unmet obligations of the federal government); see also Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Development at the Bingo Palace, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 97 (1997) (discussing the complexities of the interrelations between tribal sover-
eignty and economic independence).
239 See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, Indian Gaming Regulation: A Case Study in Neo-Coloni-
alism, GAMING L. REV. vol. 5 No. 4, at 299 (2001) (arguing that gaming tribes assist the
dominant society in undermining tribal sovereignty by capitulating to state and federal
regulation); see also Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle
and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25,
49 (1997) (“Despite the popular sentiment that the IGRA conferred a gaming ‘right’ on
Indian tribes, it is important to note that the IGRA is not the source of the tribes’ right to
engage in gaming; rather, the statute places limitation on those sovereign rights.”).
240 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992) (discussing the Indian Com-
merce Clause).
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it appears to be the most viable approach in terms of improving
reservation living conditions.241  As noted above, the advent of
widespread Indian gaming coincided with the federal govern-
ment’s policy of encouraging tribal economic development.  In fact,
IGRA’s express purposes include “provid[ing] a statutory basis for
the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments.”242
Despite this stated policy, many policymakers appear ready
to diminish tribal sovereignty by increasing federal and state con-
trol over tribal governments, particularly in the area of tribal
gaming.  Some policymakers’ apparent willingness to increase
state power over Indian gaming is in part a direct response to the
Pequots success with Foxwoods.243  As discussed above, criticism
of the Pequots and the tribe’s economic success, particularly in the
context of widespread continuing reservation poverty facing many
other tribes, essentially distills itself to the observation that the
federal government should not allow a few tribes to become
wealthy through gaming while other tribes continue to struggle.
However, this creates a false dichotomy:  on the one hand, the
fabulously gaming-rich Pequots, and on the other, tribes whose
casinos provide such meager benefits that gaming simply is not
worth the trouble it causes non-Indians.  That dichotomy, of
241 As one researcher asserted, studies have not found “a single case in Indian Country
where federal planning, programs, and management of the reservation economy has pro-
duced sustained economic development and social well-being.  The only thing that is work-
ing is self-determination—self-government.”  Kalt, supra note 41, at 2.  According to the
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development:
[W]hat really works is true self-governance.  Thus, the premise that tribes are and
ought to be treated as governments—as opposed to entitled ethnic groups, for-
profit corporations, or fraternal associations—is foundational to the examination
of Indian gaming policy.  Moreover, policies that do not take this premise into ac-
count risk undermining the gains made by tribes under [federal] self-determina-
tion [policy].
CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 8.
242 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2001).  Alongside self-determination policy, the federal govern-
ment has adopted a policy of decentralizing decision-making power by delegation, a politi-
cal concept referred to as “devolution.”  Stephen Cornell & Jonathan B. Taylor, Sovereignty,
Devolution, and the Future of Tribal-State Relations, at 1 (paper presented at the National
Congress of American Indians Mid-Year Session, June 2000) (on file with Chapman Law
Review).  As governmental control and decision-making authority continue to shift from
the federal level to state and local governments, tribes may also benefit from reduced fed-
eral controls. Id. at 1, 2.  Given the experience of tribes such as those in North Dakota, it is
the diminishment of state and federal authority and the resultant primacy of tribal author-
ity that have made the reservations better places to live. Id. at 4-5.  “[T]ribal control over
tribal affairs is the only policy that works for economic development . . . .  In short, if states
want Indian poverty and its off-reservation consequences to be adequately addressed, they
have to stop insisting that their rules apply to the exclusion of tribes’ rules.” Id. at 4.  “The
fact is that capable and sovereign tribal governments advance state goals as well as tribal
goals.  No state has an incentive to allow the kind of poverty and economic underdevelop-
ment that has characterized Indian reservations for so long to continue to fester within its
borders.” Id.
243 See discussion supra Parts II. & III.B.2.
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course, overlooks the experience of tribes like those in North Da-
kota, as described in the Plains Model.244  In fact, tribes with
higher poverty and unemployment rates are likely to pursue ca-
sino-style gaming as a form of economic development—seventeen
of the country’s largest and poorest tribes have opened casinos.245
Increasing the states’ ability to dominate the compact negotiations
and limit tribal gaming likely will hurt those tribes that most
need the revenue a casino can provide.
The media and policymakers have been quick to link gaming
and continued reservation poverty, as though tribal gaming some-
how has caused, or at least facilitated, current unemployment and
poverty rates.246  A better way to approach the question might be
to ask whether, without tribal gaming, tribes still would experi-
ence continued poverty, widespread unemployment, and relatively
minimal tribal economic development.  In the absence of Indian
gaming, it is likely that most tribes would have had little, if any,
economic development activity on their reservations.  It is, there-
fore, logical to assume that those tribes would have experienced
continuing poverty during the last decade without even the mod-
est inroads afforded by tribal gaming.247
B. From the Pequots to the Plains:  The Spectrum of Tribal
Gaming
How, then, should policymakers determine whether gaming
under IGRA should be encouraged as a strategy for tribal eco-
nomic development?  The obvious answer is to place Indian gam-
ing in the broader context of the full range of tribal experiences,
including those of large, land-based treaty tribes.  Beyond a focus
on the Pequots, the success of Indian gaming must be assessed
244 See discussion supra Part IV.B; see also Kalt, supra note 41, at 1-2.
[T]he phenomenal financial success of a tiny handful of tribes—led, of course, by
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in Connecticut. . . . obscures the facts that . . . for
every highly visible, well-run, well-capitalized casino there are many more tribal
operations that are modest enterprises providing employment and income in low-
volume, rural markets.
Id.
245 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 56.
246 The Globe series reported that “[twelve] years after the federal government made
gambling a staple of its Indian policy, the overall portrait of America’s most impoverished
racial group continues to be dominated by disease, unemployment, infant mortality, and
school drop-out rates that are among the highest in the nation.”  Rezendes, Casino Wind-
fall, supra note 5.  Representative Wolf picked up the refrain, stating that the Globe arti-
cles “illustrate the unforeseen inequities of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which has
resulted in a tainted recognition process, massive revenue windfalls for the gambling in-
dustry and a few well-connected individuals, and worst of all, continuing poverty for most
Native Americans.”  Murphy, Revision Sought, supra note 67; see also Murphy, Probe of
Indian Casinos, supra note 66.
247 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 29.  “What would the level of economic activity
have been if the [particular tribal] casino had not been built?” Id.  The answer they found
for most tribes was “simple:  there would have been no significant economic activity.” Id.
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against the background of “long-standing deficits of income, infra-
structure, employment, education, and social health that plague
Indian Country.”248  Improvements in the quality of reservation
life experienced by tribes like those in North Dakota may seem
small to critics, but the tribes’ perception is that gaming has bene-
fited tribal governments and members markedly.249  As Rick Hill,
then-chair of the National Indian Gaming Association, stated:
[I]f we are still facing poverty, unemployment, diabetes and
heart disease, suicide and untimely death, you should under-
stand that the United States forced Indian Tribes onto small,
arid, unproductive reservations while at the same time stealing
our more productive lands.  Today, we are using Indian gaming
to overcome many of the conditions that the United States has
created. . . . Today, Indian gaming helps many of our Nations
and Tribes to empower our people.250
Indeed, a more careful look at tribes across the country suggests
that the 1990s marked a possible beginning of a reversal of reser-
vation unemployment and poverty.251  Nevertheless, this reversal
is only a beginning, and a decade of casino-style gaming has not
eradicated (nor should it be expected to eradicate) the extraordi-
narily high levels of tribal unemployment and poverty.252
248 Kalt, supra note 41, at 3.
249 When asked if it was accurate to characterize the success of tribal casinos in North
Dakota as “modest,” Kurt Luger, the Executive Director of the North Dakota Indian Gam-
ing Association, emphasized the necessity of considering the tribes’ circumstances prior to
opening their casinos.  “When you have nothing, and then you have something,” he ex-
plained, modest is not the most accurate term.  Luger Telephone Interview, supra note 238.
250 Rick Hill, Some Home Truths About Indian Gaming, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Dec.
27, 2000, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/articles/perspective-2000-12-27-
02.shtml.
251 CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 31.
[T]he fundamental point is that because economic conditions were so dire on those
reservations that subsequently introduced casino gaming, even small amounts of
economic activity have proven a tremendous boon to many gaming tribes.  While
the backlog of socio-economic deficits left by decades of deprivation remains a
daunting challenge, gaming has had a profound economic development impact on
many tribes that have introduced it.
Id.
252 Id. at 60 (enumerating several factors that limit tribes’ ability to quickly reverse
social conditions).  Generally speaking, casinos can benefit tribes in two primary ways.
Kalt, supra note 41, at 2.  First, casinos can provide economic benefits by creating jobs,
personal income, and government revenue. Id. While gaming-based economic develop-
ment has not proved a silver bullet for reservation poverty, the economic effects of tribal
gaming “are making dents in the long-standing problems of poverty and associated social
ills in Indian Country.” Id.  One factor emphasized by North Dakota tribes is the creation
of casino jobs on the state’s reservations. See 2000 N. D. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note
201, at 3.  Employment opportunities created by tribal casinos are an important source of
reservation jobs for many tribes. CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 32-35.  Increased em-
ployment, of course, can lead to positive changes in social health generally.
Unemployment has an adverse effect on mortality, particularly from suicide and
lung cancer.  It is also associated with higher incidences of suicide attempts, de-
pression, and anxiety.  The onset of unemployment is associated with greater to-
bacco and alcohol use.  In addition, a higher proportion of families with
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Recently, tribes like those in the Great Plains have worked to
publicize issues that are relevant to them, such as tribal sover-
eignty, government infrastructure, employment, and health care.
Yet these issues, so central to many tribes in the United States,
get lost in the public debate over a few tribes like the Pequots,
which threatens to define policy applicable to all tribes.  Kurt
Luger, the Executive Director of the North Dakota Indian Gaming
Association, speaking with characteristic bluntness, put it this
way:
We are not damn gaming tribes, we are treaty tribes. . . .  We
are getting our a— kicked because of [wealthy, newly organized
tribes].  [The Plains] region needs to be highlighted, because our
treaties are going to be attacked and they are going to say,
“Hell, these aren’t a bunch of Indians, these are a bunch of gam-
ing tribes.”253
Critics and policymakers contend that they are concerned
about the welfare of all Native Americans, and merely seek to
avoid injustice.  Yet the proposed responses to the perceived
problems associated with tribes like the Pequots are likely to undo
the tenuous gains achieved by gaming for many tribes.  The Bos-
ton Globe identified several North Dakota tribes as the embodi-
ment of what it decried as the failed experiment of Indian
gaming.254  The tribes themselves, however, describe their gaming
enterprises as successes.
C. There Are No Pequots on the Plains
One significant shortcoming resulting from the oversimplifi-
cation of tribal experience by the media and policymakers—divid-
ing tribes into gaming “haves” and “have-nots”—is that it assumes
that the issues raised by a few tribes’ casinos apply uniformly to
all gaming tribes.  In fact, most of the issues raised in the public
debate over the Pequots simply do not exist in the context of the
Plains Model.
unemployed adults are reported as having greater risk of domestic violence and
divorce.
Id. at 57.  The second benefit casinos provide is institutional.  Kalt, supra note 41, at 2.
Because gaming revenue enables tribal independence from federal and state programs and
bureaucracies, casinos can benefit tribes by strengthening tribal government and preserv-
ing tribal sovereignty. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 241-42.
253 David Melmer, Great Plains Leaders Flex Muscle, Insist that NCAI Include Their
Agenda, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Nov. 22, 2000, available at http://www.indiancountry.
com/articles/lakota-2000-11-22-01.shtml.
254 Rezendes, Casino Windfall, supra note 5.  For example, the Globe reported that in
contrast to the success of a few tribes like the Pequots, “tribes of the Greater Sioux Nation,
with thousands of members in North and South Dakota, run about a dozen gambling halls
but generate comparatively little in the way of revenue because of the tribes’ stark isola-
tion.” Id.
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For example, the Pequots’ authenticity has been challenged
on numerous fronts.  As discussed above, two recent and highly
visible expose´s contend that current tribal members are not Pe-
quots, and likely are not even “Indians” (at least as the authors
understand the term).255  Regardless of the appropriate weight to
be given such loaded accusations, authenticity simply is not an
issue for North Dakota’s tribes.  Long recognized as sovereign by
the federal government, the tribes’ status as “Indian” is unlikely
to be seriously questioned.  Nor can there be a plausible sugges-
tion that the Plains tribes exist only to operate casinos.  As Mark
Fox explains, “Here in the Great Plains, Indian nations fought
and died for tribal sovereignty.”256  Yet, as Luger observed, the
negative attention paid to tribes like the Pequots requires all
tribes to answer similar challenges, however ill founded.257
The debate over the Pequots raises a myriad of concerns cen-
tered on the negative effects of gambling.  At the forefront, per-
haps, is the theory that Indian gaming is not subject to sufficient
regulation, exposing tribes to criminal infiltration and exploita-
tion by non-Indian management companies.  In reality, tribal
gaming enterprises are subject to three levels of government regu-
lation—federal, state, and tribal—resulting in extensive regula-
tory schemes,258 and there is little evidence to support the
pervasive specter of organized crime.259  Moreover, common sense
255 BENEDICT, supra note 132; EISLER, supra note 92.
256 Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes, supra note 36, at 337.
257 A cartoon in North Dakota’s Grand Forks Herald depicted two sets of Native arti-
facts:  one in the 1800s, including arrowheads, eagle feathers, and a buffalo skin, and one
in 2000, a slot machine. GRAND FORKS HERALD, Sept. 10, 2000, at 2B.
258 Hill, supra note 250.  In North Dakota, the state’s five tribes spend over five million
dollars each year and have hired over three hundred employees to regulate their casinos.
Id.  Additionally, the tribes pay the costs of state regulation and oversight of tribal casinos.
Luger Telephone Interview, supra note 238.  A 1998 National Indian Gaming Association
survey reported that tribes spent over $120 million to regulate gaming on their reserva-
tions.  2001 Indian Gaming Hearing, supra note 47.  New Jersey spends about fifty-four
million dollars and employs seven hundred people to regulate its dozen or so major casinos;
gaming tribes in Arizona spend about twenty-one million dollars and employ two hundred
people to regulate tribal casinos in the state, and pay another five million dollars for state
regulation. Id.; see also CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-23 (describing the regulatory
requirements at the federal, state, and tribal levels on Indian gaming and concluding that
“the scope of tribal regulations is extensive—it parallels that of New Jersey,” the state with
the “toughest” gaming regulations).  Some have dismissed tribal regulation of tribal casinos
as “the fox running the hen coop.”  Sean P. Murphy, Indian Casinos Spend to Limit US
Oversight, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 3923615 (quoting
former federal gaming regulator Anthony Hope).  Kalt, however, points out that as tribal
government-owned enterprises, tribal casinos yield public revenues, much the same way
state lotteries yield public revenues.  Kalt, supra note 41, at 2-3.  Both states and tribes use
such revenues to meet the needs of their citizens (indeed, IGRA expressly limits tribes’ use
of gaming revenues). Id.; see also CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 57 (“Just as states
dedicate lottery revenues to public purposes . . . so too do tribes.”).
259 The Globe articles “also highlighted the almost complete lack of government over-
sight of casinos already allegedly infiltrated by organized crime.”  Murphy, Probe of Indian
Casinos, supra note 66.  But the Globe article was forced to acknowledge that “tribal gam-
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and evidence indicate that in North Dakota, it is unlikely that or-
ganized crime will infiltrate only modestly successful tribal casi-
nos far from urban population centers.  As for more pedestrian
crime, North Dakota’s tribal casinos appear to have had little, if
any, effect on the state’s consistently low crime rate.260  Indeed,
one might expect that the gains made in reservation employment
would reduce crime in those areas.261  Further, each of the tribal
casinos in North Dakota is owned and operated by the tribal gov-
ernment rather than an outside management company.262  In
North Dakota, then, such concerns likely should be outweighed by
the fact that Indian gaming is one of the top economic engines in
North Dakota, providing economic benefits to Indian and non-In-
dian communities alike throughout the state.263
How do the Pequot and Plains Models assist policymakers?
These models demonstrate that a pan-Indian approach to formu-
lating or interpreting law or public policy affecting all tribal gam-
ing will have detrimental and (presumably) unintended effects on
those tribes that appear to be benefiting from gaming as Congress
envisioned under IGRA.  The Plains Model suggests that the per-
ceived negative impacts of tribal gaming, as exemplified by public
reaction to the Pequots’ success, are inappropriate bases for poli-
cymaking that would affect all tribes.  As the contrast between the
Pequot Model and the Plains Model demonstrates, tribes are not
monolithic.
ing authorities and federal law enforcement officials insist there is no evidence of wide-
spread infiltration of Indian gambling by organized crime.”  Rezendes, Tribal Casino
Operations, supra note 48.  Additionally, although one of the “financial analysts” quoted by
the Globe stated that organized crime has been linked to casinos historically, the analyst
also said, “We’re not seeing that with Indian gaming right now.” Id.; see also CORNELL ET
AL., supra note 4, at 23 n.39 (“In hearings before a House of Representatives subcommittee
in late 1993, officials from the FBI testified that they had no evidence of widespread organ-
ized crime within Indian gaming.”) (citing Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE
L. REV. 501, 521 (1994)).
260 E-mail from Jan Morley, Tribal Liason for the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of
North Dakota, to Kathryn R.L. Rand, Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota
School of Law (Dec. 6, 2001, 15:43:33 CST) (on file with Chapman Law Review); see also
Luger Telephone Interview, supra note 238; Taylor et al., supra note 3, at 26-27 (statistics
show a “substantial” decline in auto theft and robbery, and that introducing casinos into
depressed regions “would reduce the existing propensity to commit crime”).
261 Luger reported anecdotal evidence that juvenile offenses such as truancy were re-
duced on the reservations as a result of increased parental employment.  Luger Telephone
Interview, supra note 238.  “While it is typically assumed as a matter of course that any
demonstrated linkage between gaming and crime will show crime increasing following the
introduction of gaming, contrary evidence from Indian Country suggests that there are
exceptions to that common presumption.” CORNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 28-29 (pointing
to a 1996 Wisconsin study indicating that tribal casinos had not resulted in increased crime
but rather may have reduced crime caused by unemployment).
262 See supra text accompanying note 212.  Tribes’ relations with non-Indian investors
and management companies have drawn criticism. See, e.g., Murphy, Mohegan Sun, supra
note 48.
263 See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
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The realities of Indian gaming are more complex than the cur-
rent spate of criticism allows.  First, when measured by strength-
ened tribal government and improved quality of reservation life,
North Dakota’s tribal casinos are successful.  Their successes are
deserving of recognition and continued facilitation at the state and
federal levels.  Second, to the extent that one sees the Pequots’
casino as highlighting inadequacies in current Indian gaming law
and policy, one must be careful not to assume that those inade-
quacies exist in all states, or apply to all tribal casinos.  Public
policy that seeks to correct problems that do not exist in many
areas of the country plainly runs the risk of hamstringing effective
tribal efforts to improve reservation life through the exercise of
tribal sovereignty.  Misguided public policy, rather than Indian
gaming itself, runs a substantial risk of perpetuating poverty and
unemployment for Native Americans.264  Treating all tribes alike
will not benefit any tribe.  Only by recognizing the full spectrum of
tribal interests and experience, from the Pequots to the Plains,
will policymakers adequately be able to address issues arising
from tribal gaming.
CONCLUSION
From one perspective, the criticism directed at tribal gaming
makes sense:  although some tribes are wealthy and healthy,
many more continue to suffer from significant social and economic
ills.  This view, albeit overly—I argue fatally—simplistic, tempts
policymakers and public opinion with the corresponding simplicity
of its implicit solution:  if gaming isn’t solving the “Indian prob-
lem,” then why not regulate and restrict it even further?  Such a
solution, however, necessarily diminishes tribal sovereignty, and
thus likely will exacerbate the very problem it purports to solve.
Such perspectives and solutions, I suggest, are the direct re-
sult of undue focus on the Pequot Model of tribal gaming.  Poli-
cymaking in response to the Pequot Model will, in the short and
long run, harm the far greater number of tribes that are beginning
to reverse the effects of extreme poverty and unemployment for
their members through gaming.  Will gaming create prosperity for
all Native Americans?  Plainly not, but gaming is one of the few
economic development strategies making inroads toward prosper-
264 Observers note the across-the-board negative implications.
It will be a remarkable irony—and another tragedy in a long line of Indian policy
failures—if the United States were now to turn its back on the only policy that has
shown any promise of lifting reservation populations out of poverty and despair.
Such a rejection of tribal sovereignty will have costs not only to tribes but to
states, the federal government, and taxpayers generally as Indian nations con-
tinue to languish in poverty.  In backing away from meaningful self-determina-
tion, everybody loses.
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ity for many tribes.  Well-meaning criticisms of Indian gaming
that characterize the important successes of gaming tribes, like
those in North Dakota, as failures risk further compromising
tribes’ abilities to address often dire social conditions on reserva-
tions throughout the United States.  Betting that further restrict-
ing Indian gaming would improve the lives of all Native
Americans is surely not worth the gamble.
